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Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation

Author

Listed:
  • Carsten Helm

    (University of Oldenburg)

  • Franz Wirl

    (University of Vienna)

Abstract

Saint Thomas Aquinus ’agen autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis (an agent does not move except out of intention for an end, quoted from Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifragile, p. 169.)’. This paper uses the familiar multitasking framework in order to compare contracting with agents holding private information either about their work ethic or intrinsic motivation. Those characterizations are observation equivalent in the absence of incentives but matter once monetary incentives are offered. Indeed the difference is stark: First, incentives change the characterization of which types are efficient or inefficient. Second, contracts in terms of an agent’s work ethic are robust if constraints (ensuring sufficient effort for the unobservable task) are introduced while such constraints can render only fixed wages feasible for intrinsically motivated agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2021. "Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 41-65, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:132:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-020-00713-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-020-00713-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Principal-agent model; Observation-equivalent out-of-contract; Multi-tasking; Work ethic; Intrinsic motive;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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