Climate Policies with Private Information: The Case for Unilateral Action
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DOI: 10.1086/688583
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- Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2015. "Climate policies with private information: The case for unilateral action," Working Papers V-378-15, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2015.
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Cited by:
- Aurélie Slechten, 2020.
"Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information,"
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 455-481.
- Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Torben K. Mideksa, 2021. "Leadership and Climate Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 9054, CESifo.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
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