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Boards of Directors’ Self Interest: Expanding for Pay in Corporate Acquisitions?

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  • S. Certo
  • Catherine Dalton
  • Dan Dalton
  • Richard Lester

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  • S. Certo & Catherine Dalton & Dan Dalton & Richard Lester, 2008. "Boards of Directors’ Self Interest: Expanding for Pay in Corporate Acquisitions?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 219-230, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:77:y:2008:i:2:p:219-230
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-006-9345-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    11. Bliss, Richard T. & Rosen, Richard J., 2001. "CEO compensation and bank mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 107-138, July.
    12. Dalton, Dan R. & Daily, Catherine M., 2001. "Director Stock Compensation: An Invitation to a Conspicuous Conflict of Interests?," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 89-108, January.
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    16. C. B. Ingley & N. T. Van Der Walt, 2004. "Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors and Conflicts of Interest," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 534-551, October.
    17. Chidambaran, N. K. & Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R., 2003. "Executive stock option repricing, internal governance mechanisms, and management turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 153-189, July.
    18. Jonathan L. Johnson & Alan E. Ellstrand & Dan R. Dalton & Catherine M. Dalton, 2005. "The influence of the financial press on stockholder wealth: the case of corporate governance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(5), pages 461-471, May.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Etienne Redor, 2016. "Board attributes and shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions: a survey of the literature," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(4), pages 789-821, December.
    3. María del Carmen Triana & Toyah L. Miller & Tiffany M. Trzebiatowski, 2014. "The Double-Edged Nature of Board Gender Diversity: Diversity, Firm Performance, and the Power of Women Directors as Predictors of Strategic Change," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(2), pages 609-632, April.
    4. Ghannam, Samir & Matolcsy, Zoltan P. & Spiropoulos, Helen & Thai, Nathan, 2019. "The influence of powerful non-executive Chairs in Mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-104.
    5. Calabrò, Andrea & Requejo, Ignacio & Reyes-Reina, Fernando & Sanchez-Bueno, Maria J. & Suárez-González, Isabel, 2024. "Nearby or faraway? Determinants of target selection in family firm acquisitions," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4).
    6. David R. King & Gang Wang & Mehdi Samimi & Andres Felipe Cortes, 2021. "A Meta‐Analytic Integration of Acquisition Performance Prediction," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(5), pages 1198-1236, July.
    7. Mallin, Chris & Melis, Andrea & Gaia, Silvia, 2015. "The remuneration of independent directors in the UK and Italy: An empirical analysis based on agency theory," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 175-186.
    8. Steve Sauerwald & Zhiang (John) Lin & Mike W. Peng, 2016. "Board social capital and excess CEO returns," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 498-520, March.
    9. Chen, I-Ju & Hsu, Po-Hsuan & Wang, Yanzhi, 2022. "Staggered boards and product innovations: Evidence from Massachusetts State Bill HB 5640," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(4).
    10. Chee Yoong Liew & YoungKyung Ko & Bee Lian Song & Saraniah Thechina Murthy, 2022. "Directors’ compensation, ownership concentration and the value of the firm: evidence from an emerging market," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 49(1), pages 155-188, March.
    11. Udi Hoitash, 2011. "Should Independent Board Members with Social Ties to Management Disqualify Themselves from Serving on the Board?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 399-423, March.
    12. Lucie Courteau & Roberto Di Pietra & Paolo Giudici & Andrea Melis, 2017. "The role and effect of controlling shareholders in corporate governance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(3), pages 561-572, September.

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