IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v69y2003i1p153-189.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Executive stock option repricing, internal governance mechanisms, and management turnover

Author

Listed:
  • Chidambaran, N. K.
  • Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Chidambaran, N. K. & Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R., 2003. "Executive stock option repricing, internal governance mechanisms, and management turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 153-189, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:69:y:2003:i:1:p:153-189
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-405X(03)00111-9
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acharya, Viral V. & John, Kose & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 2000. "On the optimality of resetting executive stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 65-101, July.
    2. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K. & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. "Ownership structure and top executive turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 193-221, August.
    3. Cuny, Charles J. & Jorion, Philippe, 1995. "Valuing executive stock options with endogenous departure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 193-205, September.
    4. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    5. Brenner, Menachem & Sundaram, Rangarajan K. & Yermack, David, 2000. "Altering the terms of executive stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 103-128, July.
    6. Kevin J. Murphy & Brian J. Hall, 2000. "Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 209-214, May.
    7. Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne R., 2001. "Stock option plans for non-executive employees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 253-287, August.
    8. Yermack, David, 1995. "Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2-3), pages 237-269.
    9. Barber, Brad M. & Lyon, John D., 1996. "Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 359-399, July.
    10. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    11. Carpenter, Jennifer N., 1998. "The exercise and valuation of executive stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 127-158, May.
    12. John M. Abowd & Henry S. Farber, 1982. "Job Queues and the Union Status of Workers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(3), pages 354-367, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Hertzel, Michael & Kalpathy, Swaminathan, 2006. "Earnings management around employee stock option reissues," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 173-200, April.
    2. Wenxiu Tang & Bing Zhou & Chuan Lin & Weiwei Chen, 2021. "Does the threshold of information disclosure improve corporate governance? Evidence from China," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 747-765, September.
    3. Sircar, Ronnie & Xiong, Wei, 2007. "A general framework for evaluating executive stock options," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 2317-2349, July.
    4. S. Certo & Catherine Dalton & Dan Dalton & Richard Lester, 2008. "Boards of Directors’ Self Interest: Expanding for Pay in Corporate Acquisitions?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 219-230, January.
    5. Sautner, Zacharias & Weber, Martin, 2005. "Corporate governance and the design of stock option programs," Papers 05-32, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    6. Chen, Gongmeng & Firth, Michael & Gao, Daniel N. & Rui, Oliver M., 2006. "Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 424-448, June.
    7. Radnai, Márton, 2005. "Indexált alaptermék árú opciók [Indexed options based on the underlying price]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 130-143.
    8. Cynthia E. Devers & Gerry McNamara & Robert M. Wiseman & Mathias Arrfelt, 2008. "Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(4), pages 548-566, August.
    9. Catherine Casamatta & Alexander Guembel, 2010. "Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment, and Strategic Inertia," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2403-2436, December.
    10. Larcker, David F. & McCall, Allan L. & Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2013. "Proxy advisory firms and stock option repricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 149-169.
    11. McGuire, Jean & Dow, Sandra & Ibrahim, Bakr, 2012. "All in the family? Social performance and corporate governance in the family firm," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 65(11), pages 1643-1650.
    12. Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, 2009. "What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(4), pages 513-525, April.
    13. Elsaid, Eahab & Davidson III, Wallace N. & Benson, Bradley W., 2009. "CEO compensation structure following succession: Evidence of optimal incentives with career concerns," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1389-1409, November.
    14. Balsam, Steven & Miharjo, Setiyono, 2007. "The effect of equity compensation on voluntary executive turnover," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 95-119, March.
    15. Kato, Hideaki Kiyoshi & Lemmon, Michael & Luo, Mi & Schallheim, James, 2005. "An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 435-461, November.
    16. Firth, Michael & Rui, Oliver M. & Wu, Wenfeng, 2011. "Cooking the books: Recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 371-390, April.
    17. Konstantinos Tzioumis, 2013. "Are company founders underpaid?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(18), pages 2527-2536, June.
    18. Brian J. Hall & Thomas A. Knox, 2004. "Underwater Options and the Dynamics of Executive Pay‐to‐Performance Sensitivities," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 365-412, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
    2. Brian J. Hall & Thomas A. Knox, 2002. "Managing Option Fragility," NBER Working Papers 9059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/9550 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Jin, Li & Kothari, S.P., 2008. "Effect of personal taxes on managers' decisions to sell their stock," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 23-46, September.
    5. Neyland, Jordan, 2020. "Love or money: The effect of CEO divorce on firm risk and compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    6. Darsinos, T. & Satchell, S.E., 2002. "On the Valuation of Warrants and Executive Stock Options: Pricing Formulae for Firms with Multiple Warrants/Executive Options," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0218, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Paul André & M. Martin Boyer & Robert Gagné, 2002. "Do CEOs Exercise Their Stock Options Earlier than Other Executives?," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-71, CIRANO.
    8. Huson, Mark R. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Parrino, Robert, 2004. "Managerial succession and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 237-275, November.
    9. Choe, Chongwoo, 2003. "Leverage, volatility and executive stock options," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(5), pages 591-609, November.
    10. Sircar, Ronnie & Xiong, Wei, 2007. "A general framework for evaluating executive stock options," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 2317-2349, July.
    11. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13098 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Chongwoo Choe, 2001. "Maturity and exercise price of executive stock options," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(3), pages 227-250.
    13. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
    14. repec:oup:rfinst:v:21:y:2017:i:5:p:1805-1846. is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Kevin F. Hallock & Craig Olson, 2006. "The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive Employees," NBER Working Papers 11950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Kato, Hideaki Kiyoshi & Lemmon, Michael & Luo, Mi & Schallheim, James, 2005. "An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 435-461, November.
    17. Brian J. Hall & Thomas A. Knox, 2004. "Underwater Options and the Dynamics of Executive Pay‐to‐Performance Sensitivities," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 365-412, May.
    18. Hillegeist, Stephen A. & Peñalva, Fernando, 2004. "Stock option incentives and firm performance," IESE Research Papers D/535, IESE Business School.
    19. Huang, Qianqian & Jiang, Feng & Lie, Erik & Yang, Ke, 2014. "The role of investment banker directors in M&A," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 269-286.
    20. Muslu, Volkan, 2004. "Board Independence, Executive Pay Structures, and Pay Disclosure: Evidence from Europe," Working papers 4432-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    21. J. Nellie Liang & Scott Weisbenner, 2001. "Who benefits from a bull market? an analysis of employee stock option grants and stock prices," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-57, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    22. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Other publications TiSEM aee04553-20a7-475a-96e1-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    23. Konstandatos, Otto, 2020. "Fair-value analytical valuation of reset executive stock options consistent with IFRS9 requirements," Annals of Actuarial Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 188-218, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:69:y:2003:i:1:p:153-189. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.