Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model
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- Seabright, Paul, 1994. "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 889, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
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