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Tax policy and entrepreneurial entry with information asymmetry and learning

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  • Diego d’Andria

    (European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), Unit B2 Fiscal Policy Analysis)

Abstract

We study a market with entrepreneurial and worker entry where both entrepreneurs’ abilities and workers’ qualities are private information. We develop an agent-based computable model to mimic the mechanisms described in a previous analytical model (Boadway and Sato in Int Tax Public Finance 18(2):166–192, 2011). Then, we introduce the possibility that agents may learn over time about abilities and qualities of other agents, by means of Bayesian inference over informative signals. We show how such different assumptions affect the optimality of second-best tax and subsidy policies. While with no information, it is optimal to have a subsidy to labour and a simultaneous tax on entrepreneurs to curb excessive entry, with learning the detrimental effects of excessive entry are partly compensated by surplus-increasing faster learning.

Suggested Citation

  • Diego d’Andria, 2019. "Tax policy and entrepreneurial entry with information asymmetry and learning," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(5), pages 1211-1229, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:26:y:2019:i:5:d:10.1007_s10797-019-09540-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-019-09540-1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entrepreneurship; Taxation; Asymmetric information; Learning; Adverse selection; Agent-based computational model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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