IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejeap/v21y2021i2p657-694n12.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Good Co(o)p or Bad Co(o)p? Redistribution Concerns and Competition in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information

Author

Listed:
  • D’Amato Marcello

    (Department of Law, University of Napoli Suor Orsola Benincasa, CSEF and CELPE, Naples, Italy)

  • Di Pietro Christian

    (DISAE, University of Napoli Parthenope and CELPE, Naples, Italy)

  • Pietroluongo Mariafortuna

    (DISAE, University of Napoli Parthenope and CRISEI, Naples, Italy)

  • Sorge Marco M.

    (University of Salerno, Fisciano, Italy)

Abstract

Non-profit organizations (NPOs), such as financial cooperatives, have a longstanding tradition in advanced market economies. We develop a model of ‘mixed credit markets’ where pure for-profit institutions (e.g. commercial banks) can coexist with financial NPOs which feature a concern for inter-member surplus redistribution (e.g. credit cooperatives) and enjoy privileged borrower-specific information vis-à-vis their for-profit peers, while facing higher funding costs. We formally investigate market competition between the two alternative financial organizations both offering contracts whose terms entail cross subsidization. We argue that heterogeneity in organizational models can explain stable coexistence under competitive conditions, and also help us interpret the variety of market outcomes — in terms of e.g. overall coverage and market shares — as documented in modern financial systems. Importantly, the viability of redistribution-oriented NPOs is shown not to rest on under-investment issues or concerns about market power, for they can successfully operate in markets where credit rationing never arises.

Suggested Citation

  • D’Amato Marcello & Di Pietro Christian & Pietroluongo Mariafortuna & Sorge Marco M., 2021. "Good Co(o)p or Bad Co(o)p? Redistribution Concerns and Competition in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 657-694, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:21:y:2021:i:2:p:657-694:n:12
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2020-0067
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2020-0067
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/bejeap-2020-0067?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Leonardo Becchetti & Maria Melody Garcia, 2011. "Informal collateral and default risk: do 'Grameen-like' banks work in high-income countries?," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(13), pages 931-947.
    2. Bhattacharya Sudipto & Thakor Anjan V., 1993. "Contemporary Banking Theory," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 2-50, October.
    3. Degryse, Hans & De Haas, Ralph & Beck, Thorsten & van Horen, Neeltje, 2014. "When Arm?s Length Is Too Far. Relationship Banking over the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 10050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2002. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 32-53, February.
    5. Jean Bonnet & Sylvie Cieply & Marcus Dejardin, 2016. "Credit rationing or overlending? An exploration into financing imperfection," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(57), pages 5563-5580, December.
    6. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1996. "The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 12(4), pages 53-69, Winter.
    7. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Leonardo Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, 2016. "Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(10), pages 2643-2676.
    8. Sumit Agarwal, 2010. "Distance and Private Information in Lending," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(7), pages 2757-2788, July.
    9. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    10. Morduch, Jonathan, 1999. "The role of subsidies in microfinance: evidence from the Grameen Bank," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 229-248, October.
    11. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
    12. Smith, Donald J, 1984. "A Theoretic Framework for the Analysis of Credit Union Decision Making," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1155-1168, September.
    13. Bonin, John P & Jones, Derek C & Putterman, Louis, 1993. "Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1290-1320, September.
    14. Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1891-1921, October.
    15. Timothy W. Guinnane, 2002. "Delegated Monitors, Large and Small: Germany's Banking System, 1800–1914," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(1), pages 73-124, March.
    16. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    17. Bontems, Philippe & Fulton, Murray, 2009. "Organizational structure, redistribution and the endogeneity of cost: Cooperatives, investor-owned firms and the cost of procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 322-343, October.
    18. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-381, July.
    19. Smith, Donald J & Cargill, Thomas F & Meyer, Robert A, 1981. "An Economic Theory of a Credit Union," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(2), pages 519-528, May.
    20. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 2006. "Financing and Taxing New Firms under Asymmetric Information," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(4), pages 471-502, December.
    21. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Timothy Besley & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1994. "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(2), pages 491-515.
    22. Guinnane, Timothy W., 2001. "Cooperatives As Information Machines: German Rural Credit Cooperatives, 1883–1914," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 366-389, June.
    23. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
    24. repec:zbw:bofitp:2014_014 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Daripa, Arup, 2008. "Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 147-163, April.
    26. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    27. Borgen, Svein Ole, 2004. "Rethinking incentive problems in cooperative organizations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 383-393, September.
    28. Leonardo Becchetti & Maria Melody Garcia & Giovanni Trovato, 2011. "Credit Rationing and Credit View: Empirical Evidence from an Ethical Bank in Italy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(6), pages 1217-1245, September.
    29. Beck, Thorsten & de Haas, Ralph & Degryse, Hans & Van Horen, Neeltje, 2014. "When Arm’s Length Is Too Far. Relationship Banking over the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 10050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marcello D'Amato & Christian Di Pietro & Marco M. Sorge, 2019. "Serving the (Un)Deserving? The Allocation of Credit in Markets with Asymmetrically Informed Lenders," CSEF Working Papers 539, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    2. D’Amato Marcello & Di Pietro Christian & Sorge Marco M., 2020. "Credit allocation in heterogeneous banking systems," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 21(1), pages 1-33, April.
    3. Simon Cornée, 2014. "Soft Information and Default Prediction in Cooperative and Social Banks," Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity, European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises, vol. 3(1), pages 89-103, June.
    4. Ferri, Giovanni & Murro, Pierluigi, 2015. "Do firm–bank ‘odd couples’ exacerbate credit rationing?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 231-251.
    5. Refait-Alexandre, Catherine & Serve, Stéphanie, 2020. "Multiple banking relationships: Do SMEs mistrust their banks?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    6. Botsch, Matthew & Vanasco, Victoria, 2019. "Learning by lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 1-14.
    7. López-Espinosa, Germán & Mayordomo, Sergio & Moreno, Antonio, 2017. "When does relationship lending start to pay?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 16-29.
    8. Belaid, Faiçal & Boussaada, Rim & Belguith, Houda, 2017. "Bank-firm relationship and credit risk: An analysis on Tunisian firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 532-543.
    9. Cenni, Stefano & Monferrà, Stefano & Salotti, Valentina & Sangiorgi, Marco & Torluccio, Giuseppe, 2015. "Credit rationing and relationship lending. Does firm size matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 249-265.
    10. Kirschenmann, K., 2010. "The Dynamics in Requested and Granted Loan Terms when Bank and Borrower Interact Repeatedly," Other publications TiSEM 40d5005c-1626-4511-aa8a-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Berger, Allen N. & Boot, Arnoud W.A., 2024. "Financial intermediation services and competition analyses: Review and paths forward for improvement," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    12. Olivier Accominotti & Delio Lucena‐Piquero & Stefano Ugolini, 2021. "The origination and distribution of money market instruments: sterling bills of exchange during the first globalization," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 74(4), pages 892-921, November.
    13. Uchida, Hirofumi & Udell, Gregory F. & Yamori, Nobuyoshi, 2012. "Loan officers and relationship lending to SMEs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 97-122.
    14. Reto Wernli & Andreas Dietrich, 2022. "Only the brave: improving self-rationing efficiency among discouraged Swiss SMEs," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 977-1003, October.
    15. Davide Arnaudo & Giacinto Micucci & Massimiliano Rigon & Paola Rossi, 2019. "Should I Stay or Should I Go? Firms’ Mobility Across Banks in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 5(1), pages 17-37, March.
    16. Simon Cornée & Panu Kalmi & Ariane Szafarz, 2020. "The Business Model of Social Banks," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 196-226, May.
    17. Cerqueiro, Geraldo & Degryse, Hans & Ongena, Steven, 2011. "Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 503-529, October.
    18. Ozgur Emre Ergungor, 2010. "Bank Branch Presence and Access to Credit in Low‐ to Moderate‐Income Neighborhoods," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(7), pages 1321-1349, October.
    19. Kirschenmann, K., 2010. "The Dynamics in Requested and Granted Loan Terms when Bank and Borrower Interact Repeatedly," Other publications TiSEM 300df022-4701-4773-a8b7-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    20. Gregory F Udell, 2015. "SME Access to Intermediated Credit: What Do We Know and What Don't We Know?," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Angus Moore & John Simon (ed.),Small Business Conditions and Finance, Reserve Bank of Australia.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    credit markets; imperfect information; financial cooperatives; cross subsidization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:21:y:2021:i:2:p:657-694:n:12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.