IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/itaxpf/v25y2018i2d10.1007_s10797-017-9459-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The magic of layoff taxes requires equilibrium stability

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Gavrel

    (CREM, CNRS (UMR 6211) and Université de Caen Normandie)

Abstract

In the same vein as Blanchard and Tirole (J Eur Econ Assoc 6:45–77, 2008) First Pass, this note shows that, under the condition for equilibrium stability, the partial implementation of layoff taxes invariably increases firms’ profits as well as workers’ utilities by lowering payroll taxes. It also proves that, due to multiple equilibria, requiring stability does not raise any equilibrium existence issue per se. These insights could favor the introduction of firing taxes, which in practice would probably be a gradual process.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Gavrel, 2018. "The magic of layoff taxes requires equilibrium stability," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(2), pages 404-411, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:25:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10797-017-9459-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-017-9459-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10797-017-9459-y
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10797-017-9459-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mortensen, Dale & Pissarides, Christopher, 2011. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 1-19.
    2. Olivier J. Blanchard & Jean Tirole, 2008. "The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 45-77, March.
    3. Frédéric Gavrel, 2018. "The magic of layoff taxes requires equilibrium stability," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(2), pages 404-411, April.
    4. Cahuc, Pierre & Malherbet, Franck, 2004. "Unemployment compensation finance and labor market rigidity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 481-501, March.
    5. Olivier l'Haridon, 2005. "Financement des politiques du marché du travail et protection de l'emploi," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 168(2), pages 43-62.
    6. Anderson, Patricia M & Meyer, Bruce D, 1993. "Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Layoff Incentives and Cross Subsidies," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(1), pages 70-95, January.
    7. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2009. "Employment protection reform in search economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 255-273, April.
    8. Grandmont,Jean-Michel, 1985. "Money and Value," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521313643, October.
    9. repec:adr:anecst:y:1995:i:37-38:p:03 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. repec:adr:anecst:y:2008:i:89:p:04 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Julia Fath & Clemens Fuest, 2005. "Experience Rating versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model where Firms Monitor Workers," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(2), pages 299-314, June.
    12. Fella, Giulio, 2000. "Efficiency wage and efficient redundancy pay," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(8), pages 1473-1490, August.
    13. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    14. Gilles Saint-Paul, 1995. "Efficiency Wage, Commitment and Hysteresis," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 37-38, pages 39-53.
    15. Frédéric Gavrel & Isabelle Lebon, 2008. "Firing Costs, Payroll Taxes and Unemployement," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 89, pages 121-129.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Gavrel, 2018. "Mismatch and Wage Posting," Working Papers halshs-01884213, HAL.
    2. Frédéric Gavrel, 2019. "Directed search, mismatch and efficiency," Working Papers halshs-02083453, HAL.
    3. Frédéric Gavrel, 2018. "The magic of layoff taxes requires equilibrium stability," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(2), pages 404-411, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Frédéric Gavrel, 2017. "The Magic of Layoff Taxes Requires Equilibrium Stability," Working Papers halshs-01462917, HAL.
    2. Frédéric Gavrel, 2019. "Directed search, mismatch and efficiency," Working Papers halshs-02083453, HAL.
    3. Boeri, Tito & Garibaldi, Pietro & Moen, Espen R., 2017. "Inside severance pay," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 211-225.
    4. Sahin Avcioglu & Bilgehan Karabay, 2020. "Labor market regulation under self‐enforcing contracts," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(6), pages 1965-2018, December.
    5. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7hh2up94ii8d2rg9pa9vg9eh3t is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/7hh2up94ii8d2rg9pa9vg9eh3t is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Francesco Palma & Yann Thommen, 2020. "Employment Protection Reform in European Labor Markets: The Collective Bargaining Regime Matters," De Economist, Springer, vol. 168(4), pages 541-575, December.
    8. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2009. "Employment protection reform in search economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 255-273, April.
    9. Albertini, Julien & Fairise, Xavier & Terriau, Anthony, 2023. "Unemployment insurance, recalls, and experience rating," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    10. Fella Giulio, 2012. "Matching, Wage Rigidities and Efficient Severance Pay," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-35, December.
    11. Albertini, Julien & Fairise, Xavier, 2013. "Search frictions, real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 1796-1813.
    12. Michau, Jean-Baptiste, 2015. "Optimal labor market policy with search frictions and risk-averse workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 93-107.
    13. Karabay, Bilgehan & McLaren, John, 2011. "Pareto-improving firing costs?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1083-1093.
    14. Julien Albertini & Xavier Fairise, 2009. "Search frictions, real wage rigidities and theoptimal design of unemployment insurance: a study in a DSGE framework," Documents de recherche 09-03, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    15. Albanese, Andrea & Picchio, Matteo & Ghirelli, Corinna, 2020. "Timed to Say Goodbye: Does Unemployment Benefit Eligibility Affect Worker Layoffs?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    16. Olivier Charlot & Franck Malherbet, 2010. "Réforme de la protection de l'emploi et inégalités face au chômage dans un modèle d'appariement," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(1), pages 57-112.
    17. Julien Albertini & Xavier Fairise, 2018. "Layoffs, recalls and experience rating," Working Papers halshs-01879560, HAL.
    18. Laszlo Goerke, 2006. "Earnings‐related Severance Pay," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 20(4), pages 651-672, December.
    19. Launov, Andrey & Wälde, Klaus, 2016. "The employment effect of reforming a public employment agency," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 140-164.
    20. Huang, Chun-chieh & Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong, 2009. "Employment effect of dismissal pay in the presence of judicial mistakes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 38-45, March.
    21. Eguchi, Kyota, 2014. "Employment protection and incentives: Severance pay vs. procedural inconvenience," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 272-290.
    22. Rebollo-Sanz, Yolanda, 2012. "Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 403-426.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Layoff taxes; Payroll taxes; Public policy efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:25:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10797-017-9459-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.