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Financement des politiques du marché du travail et protection de l'emploi

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  • Olivier l'Haridon

Abstract

[fre] Cet article s’intéresse au lien entre la forme de la protection de l’emploi et les politiques liées au budget de l’indemnisation du chômage. A cet effet, nous étudions les interactions entre politiques de protection de l’emploi , indemnisation du chômage et subventions à l’embauche dans le cadre d’un modèle d’appariement en vue d’analyser leurs éventuelles complémentarités et les conditions de leur formation. Les politiques de protection de l’emploi sont envisagées sous deux formes : une réforme de la protection de l’emploi existante en Europe, prenant la forme de coûts administratifs de licenciement, et l’introduction d’une taxe sur les licenciements finançant le budget de l’indemnisation du chômage, inspirée du système d’experience rating américain . Il apparaît numériquement que la forme prise par la protection de l’emploi est déterminante, non seulement en termes de taux de chômage, mais également en regard du mode d’ajustement du budget de l’indemnisation du chômage. Les complémentarités entre la politique de protection de l’emploi et l’indemnisation du chômage dépendent fortement de la forme prise par la protection de l’emploi : coûts administratifs ou système d’experience rating. [eng] Labour Market Policies Budget and Job Protection.. This article focuses on the links between the form of employment protection and two elements of the labour market policies budget : unemployment benefits and hiring subsidies. We study the complementarities of such policies in a standard matching model of employment. In our model two types of employment protection reforms are investigated : a reform of the existing job protection policies in Europe (regulatory costs of lay-offs ) and the introduction of a US-style “ experience rating scheme ”. Our simulations show that the design of job protection is a crucial parameter in determining the effect of these policies on unemployment and interacts strongly with the unemployment benefit financing policy. The results suggest that the complementarities between job protection and unemployment benefit policies depend heavily on the precise form of the employment protection.

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  • Olivier l'Haridon, 2005. "Financement des politiques du marché du travail et protection de l'emploi," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 168(2), pages 43-62.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2005_num_168_2_7419
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2005.7419
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2005.7419
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    1. Frédéric Gavrel, 2018. "The magic of layoff taxes requires equilibrium stability," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(2), pages 404-411, April.

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