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On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU

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  • Claus-Jochen Haake
  • Tim Krieger
  • Steffen Minter

Abstract

Illegal immigration affects not only EU member states adjacent, but also those distant from the Mediterranean Sea due to open internal borders and intra-EU onward migration. Member states without a direct influx of illegal immigrants may therefore free-ride on border countries’ enforcement efforts, leading to a sub-optimal level of border control when immigration policy remains uncoordinated. By applying a numerical example, we show that an expected externality mechanism leads to voluntary preference revelation with respect to immigration policy under several (but not all) scenarios, thereby avoiding strategic behavior in the regular negotiation process. This policy measure requires, however, the EU Commission to take on a very active role as moderator between member states (rather than as legislator). Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Claus-Jochen Haake & Tim Krieger & Steffen Minter, 2013. "On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 583-612, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:iecepo:v:10:y:2013:i:4:p:583-612
    DOI: 10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Amitrajeet A. BATABYAL & Hamid BELADI, 2016. "A Stochastic Model Of Migrant Rescue In The Mediterranean Sea," Regional Science Inquiry, Hellenic Association of Regional Scientists, vol. 0(1), pages 79-83, June.
    2. Mayr, Karin & Minter, Steffen & Krieger, Tim, 2012. "Policies on illegal immigration in a federation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 153-165.
    3. Pierre Cahuc & Yann Algan, 2009. "Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 111-145, January.
    4. Magris, Francesco & Russo, Giuseppe, 2016. "Fiscal Revenues and Commitment in Immigration Amnesties," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 75-90.
    5. Krieger, Tim & Renner, Laura & Schmid, Lena, 2019. "Where do migrants from countries ridden by environmental conflict settle? On the scale, selection and sorting of conflict-induced migration," Discussion Paper Series 2019-03, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
    6. Giuseppe Russo & Luigi Senatore, 2013. "Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy," IZA Journal of Migration and Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 2(1), pages 1-16, December.
    7. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/8812 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8812 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Krieger, Tim, 2020. "Migration and terrorism," Discussion Paper Series 2020-06, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
    10. Pierre Cahuc & Yann Algan, 2009. "Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 111-145, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Illegal migration; Immigration policy; Border enforcement; Interregional transfers; European Union; Expected externality mechanism; F22; J61; J68;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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