Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision
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Cited by:
- Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
- Martin Hellwig, 2015. "Financial Stability and Monetary Policy," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Kube, Sebastian & Schaube, Sebastian & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Khachatryan, Elina, 2015.
"Institution formation and cooperation with heterogeneous agents,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 248-268.
- Kube, Sebastian & Schaube, Sebastian & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Khachatryan, Elina, 2014. "Institution Formation and Cooperation with Heterogeneous Agents," IZA Discussion Papers 8533, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Felix J. Bierbrauer & Martin F. Hellwig, 2015. "Public-Good Provision in Large Economies," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012.
"Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 1, pages 1-48,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1818, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000187, David K. Levine.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mechanism Design; Public-good provision; Large Economy; Voting Mechanisms;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2012-04-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2012-04-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-04-03 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2012-04-03 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2012-04-03 (Public Finance)
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