Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6
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More about this item
Keywords
Auction design; Laboratory experiment; Allocation mechanism;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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