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Assignment feedback in school choice mechanisms

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  • Daniel Stephenson

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

Abstract

This paper experimentally investigates the provision of real-time feedback about school assignments during the preference reporting period in three widely employed mechanisms: deferred acceptance, top trading cycles, and the Boston mechanism. Adaptive models predict that greater sensitivity to tentative assignments during the reporting period will produce more equilibrium assignments in all three mechanisms. Consistent with adaptive predictions, real-time assignment feedback consistently increased equilibrium assignments but did not increase truthful reporting. These findings suggest that providing feedback about assignments during the preference reporting period could help student assignment mechanisms more reliably achieve policy goals.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Stephenson, 2022. "Assignment feedback in school choice mechanisms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1467-1491, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:5:d:10.1007_s10683-022-09767-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09767-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Graydon Stephenson, 2023. "Convergence Rates in Resource Allocation Games," Working Papers 2304, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
    2. Alexander L. Brown & Daniel G. Stephenson & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2024. "Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms," Papers 2404.11883, arXiv.org.

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