Convergence Rates in Resource Allocation Games
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More about this item
Keywords
convergence; equilibrium; allocation; contest; learning;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2023-02-06 (Game Theory)
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