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Evidence on learning in coordination games

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  • John Huyck
  • Raymond Battalio
  • Frederick Rankin

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • John Huyck & Raymond Battalio & Frederick Rankin, 2007. "Evidence on learning in coordination games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 205-220, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:3:p:205-220
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9175-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
    2. Van Huyck, John B & Cook, Joseph P & Battalio, Raymond C, 1994. "Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 975-1005, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fabrice Le Lec & Astrid Matthey & Ondřej Rydval, 2023. "Punishing the weakest link - Voluntary sanctions and efficient coordination in the minimum effort game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 429-456, October.
    2. Mak, Vincent & Zwick, Rami, 2010. "Investment decisions and coordination problems in a market with network externalities: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 759-773, December.
    3. Banerjee, Simanti & Kwasnica, Anthony M. & Shortle, James S., 2012. "Agglomeration bonus in small and large local networks: A laboratory examination of spatial coordination," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 142-152.
    4. Afridi, Farzana & Dhillon, Amrita & Li, Sherry Xin & Sharma, Swati, 2020. "Using social connections and financial incentives to solve coordination failure: A quasi-field experiment in India's manufacturing sector," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    5. Jasmina Arifovic & John Ledyard, 2018. "Learning to alternate," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 692-721, September.
    6. Fabrice Le Lec & Astrid Matthey & Ondrej Rydval, 2012. "Punishment Fosters Efficiency in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-030, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    7. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2017. "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 214-251.
    8. Aniket, Kumar & Chowdhury, Rashedur, 2020. "The Tale of two Crises in the Time of Covid-19," MPRA Paper 106716, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Christopher Roby, 2021. "Can loss framing improve coordination in the minimum effort game?," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(3), pages 557-588, July.
    10. Giordani, Paolo E. & Ruta, Michele, 2013. "Coordination failures in immigration policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 55-67.
    11. Banerjee, Simanti & Kwasnica, Anthony M & Shortle, James S, 2011. "Agglomeration Bonus in Local Networks: A laboratory examination of spatial coordination failure," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2011-18, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
    12. Marianne Lefebvre, 2011. "Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources when Self-insurance is Available: an Experiment," Working Papers 11-22, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
    13. Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2016. "Disentangling Social Capital: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence on Coordination, Networks, and Cooperation," Artefactual Field Experiments 00565, The Field Experiments Website.
    14. Di Girolamo, Amalia & Drouvelis, Michalis, 2015. "The role of gender composition and size of the group in a minimum effort game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 168-170.
    15. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Shakun Mago & Laura Razzolini, 2014. "Traffic congestion: an experimental study of the Downs-Thomson paradox," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(3), pages 461-487, September.
    16. Manja Gärtner & Robert Östling & Sebastian Tebbe, 2023. "Do we all coordinate in the long run?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(1), pages 16-33, June.
    17. Ailin Leng & Lana Friesen & Kenan Kalayci & Priscilla Man, 2018. "A minimum effort coordination game experiment in continuous time," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 549-572, September.
    18. Fabrice Le Lec & Ondrej Rydval & Astrid Matthey, 2014. "Efficiency and Punishment in a Coordination Game: Voluntary Sanctions in the Minimum Effort Game," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp526, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    19. John Van Huyck & Dale O. Stahl, 2018. "Conditional behavior and learning in similar stag hunt games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 513-526, September.

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