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Management of common property resources: Limits to voluntary collective action

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Abstract

This paper finds that the voluntary collective action may be an alternative to market and government in the management of common property resources. In developing countries, the people's capabilities to harness the preserved commons and the fairness in the appropriation of benefits from them are the limits on the voluntary collective action. It shows that collective action is possible if an outside agency plays the role of a catalyst in mitigating these limits. It also shows that there can be mutually beneficial sharing arrangements between government and village communities for the management of local forest resources. The standard result that common and state property resources turn into open access resources as population grows also holds good for the natural resources jointly managed by government and people. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

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  • M. Murty, 1994. "Management of common property resources: Limits to voluntary collective action," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(6), pages 581-594, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:4:y:1994:i:6:p:581-594
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00693047
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wade, Robert, 1987. "The Management of Common Property Resources: Finding a Cooperative Solution," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 2(2), pages 219-234, July.
    2. Bromley, D.W. & Cernea, M.M., 1989. "The Management Of Common Property Natural Resources - Some Conceptual And Operational Fallacies," World Bank - Discussion Papers 57, World Bank.
    3. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dambala Gelo & Edwin Muchapondwa & Steven F. Koch, 2013. "Do the Poor Benefit from Devolution Policies? Evidences from Quantile Treatment Effect Evaluation of Joint Forest Management," Working Papers 400, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    2. Shun Wang, 2010. "Social Capital, Local Government, and the Management of Irrigation Systems in Northwest China," EEPSEA Research Report rr2010122, Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA), revised Dec 2010.
    3. Keijiro Otsuka & Ridish Pokharel, 2014. "In search of appropriate institutions for forest management," GRIPS Discussion Papers 13-25, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
    4. Dambala Gelo & Steven F. Koch, 2012. "Welfare and common property rights forestry: Evidence from Ethiopian villages," Working Papers 277, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    5. Dambala Gelo & Steven F. Koch, 2011. "The Welfare Effect of Common Property Forestry Rights:Evidence from Ethiopian Villages," Working Papers 201123, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
    6. Unknown, 2006. "Book Reviews," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 61(2), pages 1-13.
    7. Gelo, Dambala & Koch, Steven F., 2014. "The Impact of Common Property Right Forestry: Evidence from Ethiopian Villages," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 395-406.

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    Keywords

    JEL Classification; H23;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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