Allocating Tradable Permits on the Basis of Market Price to Achieve Cost Effectiveness
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-008-9210-3
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- Alessio D'Amato & Edilio Valentini & Mariangela Zoli, 2016. "Tradable Quotas Taxation and Market Power," CEIS Research Paper 371, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 24 Mar 2016.
- Jørgen Juel Andersen & Mads Greaker, 2018. "Emission Trading with Fiscal Externalities: The Case for a Common Carbon Tax for the Non-ETS Emissions in the EU," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(3), pages 803-823, November.
- Wang, M. & Zhou, P., 2022. "A two-step auction-refund allocation rule of CO2 emission permits," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
- Eyckmans, Johan & Hagem, Cathrine, 2011. "The European Union's potential for strategic emissions trading through permit sales contracts," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 247-267, January.
- J rgen Juel Andersen & Mads Greaker, 2014.
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- Jørgen Juel Andersen & Mads Greaker, 2014. "The fiscal incentive of GHG cap and trade. Permits may be too cheap and developed countries may abate too little," Discussion Papers 785, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Wang, Yizhong & Hang, Ye & Wang, Qunwei, 2024. "Multi-pollutants allocation and compensation schemes: A new approach considering materials balance principle," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
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- Wang, Ge & Zhang, Qi & Li, Yan & Mclellan, Benjamin C. & Pan, Xunzhang, 2019. "Corrective regulations on renewable energy certificates trading: Pursuing an equity-efficiency trade-off," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 970-982.
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Keywords
Climate change; Emission permits; Allocation; Cost effectiveness; Distributional constraints;All these keywords.
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