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Researching Preferences, Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

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  • Rolando Guzman
  • Charles Kolstad

Abstract

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Rolando Guzman & Charles Kolstad, 2007. "Researching Preferences, Valuation and Hypothetical Bias," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(3), pages 465-487, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:37:y:2007:i:3:p:465-487
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9034-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guzman, Rolando M & Kolstad, Charles D., 1997. "Auction Equilibrium with Costly Information Acquisition," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt4w0787ng, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tunçel, Tuba & Hammitt, James K., 2014. "A new meta-analysis on the WTP/WTA disparity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 175-187.
    2. Hermann Donfouet & P. Jeanty & P.-A. Mahieu, 2014. "Dealing with internal inconsistency in double-bounded dichotomous choice: an application to community-based health insurance," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 317-328, February.
    3. Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert‐Vincent Joule & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2011. "Do People Always Pay Less Than They Say? Testbed Laboratory Experiments with IV and HG Values," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 857-882, October.
    4. Milad Haghani & Michiel C. J. Bliemer & John M. Rose & Harmen Oppewal & Emily Lancsar, 2021. "Hypothetical bias in stated choice experiments: Part I. Integrative synthesis of empirical evidence and conceptualisation of external validity," Papers 2102.02940, arXiv.org.
    5. Haghani, Milad & Bliemer, Michiel C.J. & Rose, John M. & Oppewal, Harmen & Lancsar, Emily, 2021. "Hypothetical bias in stated choice experiments: Part I. Macro-scale analysis of literature and integrative synthesis of empirical evidence from applied economics, experimental psychology and neuroimag," Journal of choice modelling, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    6. Nathalie Havet & Magali Morelle & Alexis Penot & Raphaël Remonnay, 2012. "The information content of the WTP-WTA gap: An empirical analysis among severely ill patients," Working Papers 1213, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    7. Pierre-Alexandre Mahieu & François-Charles Wolff & Jason Shogren & Pascal Gastineau, 2017. "Interval bidding in a distribution elicitation format," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(51), pages 5200-5211, November.
    8. Stefan Eriksson & Per Johansson & Sophie Langenskiöld, 2017. "What is the right profile for getting a job? A stated choice experiment of the recruitment process," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 803-826, September.
    9. Koundouri, Phoebe & Halkos, George & Landis, Conrad & Alamanos, Angelos, 2023. "Ecosystem Services Valuation for supporting Sustainable Life Below Water," MPRA Paper 122009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Gómez-Limón, José A. & Granado-Díaz, Rubén, 2023. "Assessing the demand for hydrological drought insurance in irrigated agriculture," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 276(C).
    11. Pierre-Alexandre Mahieu & Romain Crastes & Jordan Louviere & Ewa Zawojska, 2016. "Rewarding truthful-telling in stated preference studies," Working Papers 2016-33, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    12. Sardaro, Ruggiero & Faccilongo, Nicola & Roselli, Luigi, 2019. "Wind farms, farmland occupation and compensation: Evidences from landowners’ preferences through a stated choice survey in Italy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    13. Araña, Jorge E. & León, Carmelo J., 2013. "Dynamic hypothetical bias in discrete choice experiments: Evidence from measuring the impact of corporate social responsibility on consumers demand," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 53-61.
    14. Bush, Glenn & Hanley, Nicholas & Rondeau, Daniel, 2011. "Comparing opportunity cost measures of forest conservation in Uganda; implications for assessing the distributional impacts of forest management approac hes," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2011-12, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
    15. Jesús Martín-Fernández & Gloria Ariza-Cardiel & Luz Mª Peña-Longobardo & Elena Polentinos-Castro & Juan Oliva-Moreno & Ana Isabel Gil-Lacruz & Héctor Medina-Palomino & Isabel del Cura-González, 2017. "“Gaining or losing”: The importance of the perspective in primary care health services valuation," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(12), pages 1-14, December.
    16. repec:dau:papers:123456789/9717 is not listed on IDEAS

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