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Information acquisition and research differentiation prior to an open-bid auction1

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  • Moresi, Serge

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  • Moresi, Serge, 2000. "Information acquisition and research differentiation prior to an open-bid auction1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 723-746, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:18:y:2000:i:5:p:723-746
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tom K. Lee, 1982. "Resource Information Policy and Federal Resource Leasing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 561-568, Autumn.
    2. Lee, Tom K., 1985. "Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 18(2-3), pages 129-132.
    3. Froot, Kenneth A & Scharftstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1992. "Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1461-1484, September.
    4. Hausch, Donald B & Li, Lode, 1993. "A Common Value Auction Model with Endogenous Entry and Information Acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 315-334, April.
    5. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H & Wilson, Charles A, 1994. "Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1415-1444, November.
    6. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr & Prokop, Jacek, 1993. "The Dynamics of the Free-Rider Problem in Takeovers," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 851-882.
    7. Sankar De & Peter J. Knez, 1993. "Managerial Reaction to Takeover Bids: A Theory of Strategic Resistance," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(4), pages 567-592, December.
    8. Burkart, Mike, 1995. "Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1491-1515, December.
    9. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    10. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Riley, John G., 1991. "Equilibria in open common value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 101-130, February.
    11. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-943, June.
    12. De, Sankar & Knez, Peter J, 1993. "Managerial Reaction to Takeover Bids: A Theory of Strategic Resistance," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(4), pages 567-592, Winter.
    13. Admati, Anat R. & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1987. "Viable allocations of information in financial markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 76-115, October.
    14. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    15. Robert B. Wilson, 2021. "Strategic Analysis of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 555-561, March.
    16. Milgrom, Paul & Weber, Robert J., 1982. "The value of information in a sealed-bid auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 105-114, June.
    17. d'Aspremont, C & Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold & Thisse, J-F, 1979. "On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1145-1150, September.
    18. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
    19. Michael J. Fishman, 1988. "A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 88-101, Spring.
    20. Hirshleifer, David & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar & Titman, Sheridan, 1994. "Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information before Others," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(5), pages 1665-1698, December.
    21. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    22. Paul, Jonathan M, 1993. "Crowding Out and the Informativeness of Security Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1475-1496, September.
    23. Christopher Avery, 1998. "Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(2), pages 185-210.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bourjade, Sylvain, 2002. "Diversification of Investor's Expertise in IPOs," MPRA Paper 7259, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2007.
    2. García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.
    3. Sylvain Bourjade, 2021. "The role of expertise in syndicate formation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 844-870, November.
    4. Ying-Ju Chen & Gustavo Vulcano, 2009. "Effects of Information Disclosure Under First- and Second-Price Auctions in a Supply Chain Setting," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 11(2), pages 299-316, September.

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