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Do presumptions of negligence incentivize optimal precautions?

Author

Listed:
  • Alice Guerra

    (University of Bologna
    University of Bologna)

  • Barbara Luppi

    (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia)

  • Francesco Parisi

    (University of Minnesota Law School
    University of Bologna)

Abstract

In most jurisdictions, the burden of producing evidence on a contested issue traditionally falls on plaintiffs. In a tort claim, this de facto creates a presumption of non-negligence in favor of injurers. Some legal systems in Europe placed renewed attention on “presumed liability” rules, which instead create a presumption of negligence against injurers. In this paper, we analyze the effects of alternative legal presumptions on parties’ care incentives in the presence of discovery errors. Differently from what was suggested in prior research, we show that legal presumptions do affect primary behavior: presuming that the injurer was (not) negligent strengthens (weakens) his care incentives in situations where the plaintiff faces probatory difficulties. We analyze how these effects should inform the choice of evidence regimes to improve the robustness of liability rules, and to minimize the dilutive effect of imperfect discovery on individuals’ care incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Alice Guerra & Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2022. "Do presumptions of negligence incentivize optimal precautions?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 349-368, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:54:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s10657-022-09737-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-022-09737-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legal presumptions; Presumed liability; Care incentives; Discovery errors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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