Regulatory enforcement in the presence of a court system
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Cited by:
- Magnus Söderberg, 2008.
"Uncertainty and regulatory outcome in the Swedish electricity distribution sector,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 79-94, February.
- Magnus Söderberg, 2008. "Uncertainty and regulatory outcome in the Swedish electricity distribution sector," Post-Print hal-00869800, HAL.
- Marcelo Caffera & Carlos Chávez, 2011. "The Cost-Effective Choice of Policy Instruments to Cap Aggregate Emissions with Costly Enforcement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(4), pages 531-557, December.
- Kirstein, Roland, 2005. "Bayesian Monitoring," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2005-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2014. "Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, April.
- Roland Kirstein, 2014. "Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(4), pages 385-409, August.
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