IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v3y1992i3p381-397.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Crafting social rules: Common law vs. statute law, once again

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Wagner

Abstract

While a considerable literature has arisen seeking to compare the economic efficiency of common law and statute law processes, some scholars have argued that these efforts are misplaced because what should be assessed is not efficiency but stability of expectations. This paper argues that any generic comparison of common law and statute law must be inconclusive, because there is no such thing asthe common law or statute law process. Rather, there are many particular processes, and any claim based on a comparison of generic alternatives will falter because it will fail to reflect essential institutional detail. Copyright George Mason University 1992

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Wagner, 1992. "Crafting social rules: Common law vs. statute law, once again," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 381-397, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:3:y:1992:i:3:p:381-397
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393142
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02393142
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF02393142?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1978. "Adjudication as a Private Good," NBER Working Papers 0263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
    3. Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2013. "The political economy of antitrust," Chapters, in: Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand (ed.), The International Handbook of Competition – Second Edition, chapter 6, pages 169-206, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    5. Louis Alessi & Robert Staaf, 1991. "The common law process: Efficiency or order?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 107-126, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Morselli, 2022. "An Institutionalist-Conventionalist Approach to the Process of Economic Change," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 4, pages 411-428.
    2. Francesco Parisi, 2000. "The Cost of the Game: A Taxonomy of Social Interactions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 99-114, March.
    3. Richard Wagner, 2006. "Retrogressive regime drift within a theory of emergent order," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 113-123, June.
    4. L. Van Den Hauwe, 1998. "Evolution and the Production of Rules—Some Preliminary Remarks," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 81-117, January.
    5. Francesco Parisi, 1995. "Toward a theory of spontaneous law," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 211-231, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Eckardt, Martina, 2004. "Evolutionary approaches to legal change," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 47, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    2. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2007. "Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 199-229, October.
    3. John Boatright, 2009. "Rent Seeking in a Market with Morality: Solving a Puzzle About Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 88(4), pages 541-552, October.
    4. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    5. Alessi Louis De, 1998. "Reflections on Coase, Cost, and Efficiency," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 5-26, March.
    6. Michael Wohlgemuth, 1995. "Economic and political competition in neoclassical and evolutionary perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 71-96, December.
    7. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    8. Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, "undated". "Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats," IEW - Working Papers 187, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    9. Cristina Ciocirlan & Bruce Yandle, 2003. "The Political Economy of Green Taxation in OECD Countries," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 203-218, May.
    10. Charles DeLorme & Stacey Isom & David Kamerschen, 2005. "Rent seeking and taxation in the Ancient Roman Empire," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(6), pages 705-711.
    11. Marcin Kalinowski, 2005. "Ekonomiczne przesłanki lobbingu w świetle teorii public choice," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 7-8, pages 29-44.
    12. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 411-422, September.
    13. Alden Abbott & Gordon Brady, 1999. "The Liberalization of the Telecommunications Sector: A Rent-Seeking Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 63-77, July.
    14. Stallings, David A., 1990. "Increased Protection in the 1980's: Exchange Rates and Institutions," 1990: The Environment, Government Policies, and International Trade Meeting, December 1990, San Diego, CA 50885, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    15. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    16. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    17. Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, 2005. "Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 79-105.
    18. Nahapetyan Yervand, 2019. "The benefits of the Velvet Revolution in Armenia: Estimation of the short-term economic gains using deep neural networks," Central European Economic Journal, Sciendo, vol. 6(53), pages 286-303, January.
    19. Sobel, Andrew C., 2002. "State institutions, risk, and lending in global capital markets," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 725-752, December.
    20. repec:elg:eechap:15325_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004. "Ulysses and the Rent-Seekers: The Benefits and Challenges of Constitutional Constraints on Leviathan," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, pages 245-278, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:3:y:1992:i:3:p:381-397. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.