Resolving rent-seeking puzzles: A model of political influence via social signals
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-POL-2014-08-16 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2014-08-16 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
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