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Does Information on the Internet Weaken the Case for Consumer Protection Regulation?

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  • John C. Moorehouse

    (Wake Forest University)

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  • John C. Moorehouse, 2001. "Does Information on the Internet Weaken the Case for Consumer Protection Regulation?," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 16(Spring 20), pages 138-160.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:226
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stiglitz, J E, 1979. "Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 339-345, May.
    2. Ippolito, Pauline M, 1990. "Bonding and Nonbonding Signals of Product Quality," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 41-60, January.
    3. Benjamin, Daniel K & Dougan, William R, 1997. "Individuals' Estimates of the Risks of Death: Part I--A Reassessment of the Previous Evidence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 115-133, November.
    4. Benjamin, Daniel K & Dougan, William R & Buschena, David, 2001. "Individuals' Estimates of the Risks of Death: Part II--New Evidence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 35-57, January.
    5. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
    6. Simon Rottenberg, 1980. "Occupational Licensure and Regulation," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 968900, September.
    7. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    8. Lacy Glenn Thomas, 1988. "Revealed Bureaucratic Preference: Priorities of the Consumer Product Safety Commission," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 102-113, Spring.
    9. george-j-stigler & Manuel F. Cohen, 1971. "Can Regulatory Agencies Protect the Consumer?," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 936221, September.
    10. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    11. W. Kip Viscusi, 1978. "A Note on "Lemons" Markets with Quality Certification," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 277-279, Spring.
    12. Geoffrey Heal, 1976. "Do Bad Products Drive Out Good?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(3), pages 499-502.
    13. Franklin Allen, 1984. "Reputation and Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 311-327, Autumn.
    14. Viscusi, W Kip, 1985. "Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 527-553, October.
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