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A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Hofmann Elisa

    (Department of Intercultural Studies and Business Communications, University of Jena, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 8, D-07743 Jena, Germany)

  • Kyriacou Lucas

    (Department of Economics, University of Bern, Schanzeneckstraße 1, CH-3001 Bern, Switzerland)

  • Schmidt Klaus M.

    (Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstraße 28, D-80539 Munich, Germany)

Abstract

Weitzman, M.L. (2014. Can negotiating a uniform carbon price help to internalize the global warming externality? J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1: 29–49) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform carbon price) is more effective than negotiations on individual commitments (as in the Paris agreement) in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel experimental format combines some of the advantages of lab and field experiments. Our results offer support for Weitzman’s hypothesis and indicate that negotiating a common commitment on a uniform carbon price may yield higher emission reductions in the long run and more participation than individual commitments à la Paris.

Suggested Citation

  • Hofmann Elisa & Kyriacou Lucas & Schmidt Klaus M., 2023. "A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 243(5), pages 543-566, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:243:y:2023:i:5:p:543-566:n:6
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2021-0054
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    climate negotiations; negotiation design; model united nations; uniform carbon price;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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