IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aen/eeepjl/eeep4-2-cramton.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An International Carbon-Price Commitment Promotes Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft

Abstract

To promote cooperation in international climate negotiations, negotiators should focus on a common commitment. Such commitments have the advantage of facilitating reciprocal "I will if you will" agreements in a group. Reciprocity is the basis for cooperation in repeated public goods games, and a uniform price would provide a natural focal point for a common international commitment. Such a price is also essential for efficient abatement. Countries would retain flexibility in how to implement the price - with cap-and-trade, a carbon tax, or a hybrid approach. Country risk is reduced relative to risk under international cap-and-trade since carbon revenues stay within the country. Price commitments also tend to equalize effort intensity and can facilitate enforcement. To encourage participation by less-developed countries, a green fund is needed to transfer money from richer to poorer countries. Transfers are smaller and more predictable with a uniform price commitment than with international cap and trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft, 2015. "An International Carbon-Price Commitment Promotes Cooperation," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
  • Handle: RePEc:aen:eeepjl:eeep4-2-cramton
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/eeeparticle.aspx?id=92
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to IAEE members and subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9ji2150pi6 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Stéphane Dion & Eloi Laurent, 2012. "From Rio to Rio :a global carbon price signal to escape the great climate inconstitency," Working Papers hal-03461215, HAL.
    3. Martin L. Weitzman, 2015. "Internalizing the Climate Externality: Can a Uniform Price Commitment Help?," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    4. Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2009. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1335-1355, September.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, April.
    6. Jean Tirole, 2012. "Some Political Economy of Global Warming," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    7. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    8. Steven Stoft, 2009. "Flexible Global Carbon Pricing: A Backward-Compatible Upgrade for the Kyoto Protocol," RSCAS Working Papers 2009/35, European University Institute.
    9. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2015. "Overcoming the Copenhagen Failure with Flexible Commitments," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    10. Stiglitz Joseph, 2006. "A New Agenda for Global Warming," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 3(7), pages 1-4, July.
    11. Arrow Kenneth J, 2007. "Global Climate Change: A Challenge to Policy," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 4(3), pages 1-5, June.
    12. Martin L. Weitzman, 2014. "Can Negotiating a Uniform Carbon Price Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality?," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 29-49.
    13. Christian Gollier and Jean Tirole, 2015. "Negotiating effective institutions against climate change," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    14. William Nordhaus, 2015. "Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1339-1370, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hajime Takatsuka, 2020. "Uniform emission taxes, abatement, and spatial disparities," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 64(4), pages 1133-1166, October.
    2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022. "Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection," TUPD Discussion Papers 20, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
    3. Schmidt, Klaus M., 2021. "Das Design von Klimaschutzverhandlungen," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 270, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Frondel, Manuel, 2017. "Deutschlands Klimapolitik: Höchste Zeit für einen Strategiewechsel," RWI Materialien 117, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    5. Christian Gollier and Jean Tirole, 2015. "Negotiating effective institutions against climate change," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    6. Antón, Arturo, 2020. "Taxing crude oil: A financing alternative to mitigate climate change?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    7. Buchholz Wolfgang & Heindl Peter, 2015. "Ökonomische Herausforderungen des Klimawandels," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 324-350, December.
    8. Hofmann, Elisa & Kyriacou, Lucas & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2021. "A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 266, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    9. Rong Wang & Juan Moreno-Cruz & Ken Caldeira, 2017. "Will the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation produce an incentive to continue carbon emissions?," Post-Print hal-03226925, HAL.
    10. Hofmann Elisa & Kyriacou Lucas & Schmidt Klaus M., 2023. "A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 243(5), pages 543-566, October.
    11. Newbery, David, 2018. "Policies for decarbonizing a liberalized power sector," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 12, pages 1-24.
    12. Lucas Bretschger, 2017. "Equity and the convergence of nationally determined climate policies," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 19(1), pages 1-14, January.
    13. Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh & Arild Angelsen & Andrea Baranzini & W.J. Wouter Botzen & Stefano Carattini & Stefan Drews & Tessa Dunlop & Eric Galbraith & Elisabeth Gsottbauer & Richard B. Howarth & Em, 2018. "Parallel tracks towards a global treaty on carbon pricing," Working Papers 2018/12, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    14. Sigit Perdana & Rod Tyers, 2020. "Global Climate Change Mitigation: Strategic Incentives," The Energy Journal, , vol. 41(3), pages 183-206, May.
    15. Cseh, Arpad, 2016. "Designing a Climate Agreement for the Reality of Self-interested and Short-term Oriented Nations," MPRA Paper 71428, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Robert S. Pindyck, 2017. "Coase Lecture—Taxes, Targets and the Social Cost of Carbon," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(335), pages 345-364, July.
    17. Peter Cramton, Axel, Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft, 2015. "Symposium on "International Climate Negotiations" - Introduction," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    18. Christian Gambardella & Michael Pahle & Wolf-Peter Schill, 2016. "Do Benefits from Dynamic Tariffing Rise? Welfare Effects of Real-Time Pricing under Carbon-Tax-Induced Variable Renewable Energy Supply," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1621, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    19. Frans van Winden & Mirre Stallen & K. Richard Ridderinkhof, 2008. "On the Nature, Modeling, and Neural Bases of Social Ties," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-063/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    20. Aaron Kamm & Simon Siegenthaler, 2024. "Commitment timing in coalitional bargaining," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(1), pages 130-154, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aen:eeepjl:eeep4-2-cramton. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David Williams (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iaeeeea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.