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Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design

Author

Listed:
  • André Veski

    (Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia)

  • Péter Biró

    (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary)

  • Kaire Põder

    (Estonian Business School, Estonia)

  • Triin Lauri

    (Tallinn University, Estonia)

Abstract

We examine Kindergarten allocation practices in an Estonian municipality, Harku. Based on our recommendations, the allocation mechanism in Harku was redesigned in 2016. The new mechanism produces a child-optimal stable matching, with priorities primarily based on siblings and distance. We evaluate seven policy designs based on 2016 admission data in order to understand efficiency and fairness trade-offs. In addition to the descriptive data analysis, we conduct a counter-factual policy comparison and sensitivity analysis using computational experiments with generated preferences. We fix the allocation mechanism to be the child-oriented Deferred-Acceptance algorithm, but we vary how the priorities are created by altering sibling and distance factors. Different lotteries are included for breaking ties. We find that different ways of considering the same priority factors can have a significant aggregate effect on the allocation. Additionally, we survey a dozen special features that can create significant challenges (both theoretical and practical) in redesigning the allocation mechanism in Estonian Kindergartens, and potentially elsewhere as well.

Suggested Citation

  • André Veski & Péter Biró & Kaire Põder & Triin Lauri, 2017. "Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 2(1), pages 57-104, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v2i1a3
    DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2017.12.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Biró, Péter & Gudmundsson, Jens, 2021. "Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 291(2), pages 614-628.
    2. Hai Nguyen & Thành Nguyen & Alexander Teytelboym, 2021. "Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7438-7454, December.
    3. Tobias Reischmann & Thilo Klein & Sven Giegerich, 2021. "A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 6(1), pages 59-100, December.
    4. Reischmann, Tobias & Klein, Thilo & Giegerich, Sven, 2021. "An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-095, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Britta Hoyer & Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2020. "Stability in Weighted College Admissions Problems," Working Papers Dissertations 63, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Kindergarten allocation; policy design; mechanism design.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare

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