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Market competition and executive pay

Author

Listed:
  • Priscila Ferreira

    (University of Minho, Portugal)

Abstract

Deregulation and managerial compensation are two important topics on the political and academic agenda. The former has been a significant policy recommendation in light of the negative effects associated with overly restrictive regulation on markets and the economy. The latter relates to the sharp increase in top executives’ pay and the nature of the link between pay and performance. To the extent that product-market competition can affect the incentive schemes offered by firms to their executives, the analysis of the effects of competition on the structure of compensation can be informative for policy purposes.

Suggested Citation

  • Priscila Ferreira, 2019. "Market competition and executive pay," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 115-115, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izawol:journl:2019:n:115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hiller, Victor & Raffin, Natacha, 2020. "Firms’ social responsibility and workers’ motivation at the industry equilibrium," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 131-149.
    2. Alexandra M. Espinosa, 2018. "The Cournot-Ricardo Solution under Domestic Free Movement of Labour," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 295-302, September.
    3. Gintautas Radvila & Violeta Šilingienė, 2020. "Designing Remuneration Systems of Organizations for Sustainable HRM: The Core Characteristics of an Emerging Field," International Journal of Human Resource Studies, Macrothink Institute, vol. 10(2), pages 252279-2522, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    barriers to entry; entry costs; competition; executive compensation; performance-related pay;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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