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¿Es Eficiente el Sistema Tributario Chileno?

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  • Pablo Serra
  • Juan Toro

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the efficiency of the Chilean tax system. For analytical purposes we distinguish between the tax structure and the performance of the tax administration. The tax structure is relatively efficient. Consumption taxes acco

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Serra & Juan Toro, 1994. "¿Es Eficiente el Sistema Tributario Chileno?," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 31(94), pages 423-448.
    • Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:31:y:1994:i:94:p:423-448
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    References listed on IDEAS

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