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Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots

Author

Listed:
  • Michael O. Ball

    (Robert H. Smith School of Business and Institute for Systems Research, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742;)

  • Alexander S. Estes

    (Institute for Mathematics and Its Applications, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55414;)

  • Mark Hansen

    (Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720)

  • Yulin Liu

    (Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720)

Abstract

In this paper, we define and investigate quantity-contingent auctions. Such auctions can be used when there exist multiple units of a single product and the value of a set of units depends on the total quantity sold. For example, a road network or airport will become congested as the number of users increase so that a permit for use becomes more valuable as the total number allocated decreases. A quantity-contingent auction determines both the number of items sold and an allocation of items to bidders. Because such auctions could be used by bidders to gain excessive market power, we impose constraints limiting market power. We focus on auctions that allocate airport arrival and departure slots. We propose a continuous model and an integer programming model for the associated winner determination problem. Using these models, we perform computational experiments that lend insights into the properties of the quantity-contingent auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael O. Ball & Alexander S. Estes & Mark Hansen & Yulin Liu, 2020. "Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(4), pages 858-881, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ortrsc:v:54:y:2020:i:4:p:858-881
    DOI: 10.1287/trsc.2020.0995
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    4. Dixit, Aasheesh & Jakhar, Suresh Kumar, 2021. "Airport capacity management: A review and bibliometric analysis," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    5. Pan-Yang Su & Chinmay Maheshwari & Victoria Tuck & Shankar Sastry, 2024. "Incentive-Compatible Vertiport Reservation in Advanced Air Mobility: An Auction-Based Approach," Papers 2403.18166, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    6. Guglielmo Lulli & Amedeo Odoni & Bruno F. Santos, 2020. "Introduction to the Special Section: Air Transportation Systems Planning and Operations Under Uncertainty," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(4), pages 855-857, July.

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