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The use of auctions for allocating airport access rights

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  • Ball, Michael O.
  • Berardino, Frank
  • Hansen, Mark

Abstract

This paper considers the challenge of managing congestion at an airport by restricting the total number of flight operations at that airport. It reviews historical evidence, economic theory and data analysis related to the challenge of airport congestion management. It argues that this evidence presents a strong case for the use of a market mechanism to control access and more specifically for the use of periodic auctions to allocate limited term slot leases. It then shows that the existing body of knowledge and practical experience with the use of combinatorial auctions lead naturally to highly viable auction designs for the airport slot context. It further provides analysis of a variety of specific issues related to the use of auctions in the context of airport slots.

Suggested Citation

  • Ball, Michael O. & Berardino, Frank & Hansen, Mark, 2018. "The use of auctions for allocating airport access rights," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 114(PA), pages 186-202.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transa:v:114:y:2018:i:pa:p:186-202
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2017.09.026
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    Cited by:

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    3. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & David C. Parkes & Richard Steinberg, 2024. "Combinatorial Auctions in Practice," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 517-553, June.
    4. Eduardo Cardadeiro & João E. Gata, 2023. "Market-based allocation of airport slots: the PAUSE auction mechanism and extensions," Working Papers REM 2023/0260, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
    5. Nuno Antunes Ribeiro & Alexandre Jacquillat & António Pais Antunes, 2019. "A Large-Scale Neighborhood Search Approach to Airport Slot Allocation," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(6), pages 1772-1797, November.
    6. Stojadinović, Nikola & Bošković, Branislav & Trifunović, Dejan & Janković, Slađana, 2019. "Train path congestion management: Using hybrid auctions for decentralized railway capacity allocation," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 123-139.
    7. Michael O. Ball & Alexander S. Estes & Mark Hansen & Yulin Liu, 2020. "Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(4), pages 858-881, July.
    8. Hu, Yue & Dai, Liang & Fuellhart, Kurt & Witlox, Frank, 2024. "Examining competition among airline regarding route portfolios at domestic hubs under government regulation: The case of China's aviation market," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    9. Jou, Rong-Chang & Kuo, Chung-Wei & Chiu, Yi-Chun, 2022. "Bidding behaviors for international airline seats in short/long distance flights," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 55-79.
    10. Sun, Xiaoqian & Wandelt, Sebastian & Zhang, Anming, 2022. "Ghostbusters: Hunting abnormal flights in Europe during COVID-19," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 203-217.

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