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Noncooperative Games for Subcontracting Operations

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  • George L. Vairaktarakis

    (Department of Operations, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106)

Abstract

Consider a set of manufacturers, all of which can subcontract part of their workload to a third party. For simplicity, we assume that every manufacturer as well as the third party each possess a single production facility. Each manufacturer has to decide the amount of workload to be subcontracted so as to minimize the completion time of his in-house and subcontracted workloads. In an effort to provide good service to all, the third party gives priority to manufacturers whose subcontracted workload is small. This incentive scheme forces manufacturers to compete for position in the third-party processing sequence. We develop pure Nash equilibria schedules under three distinct protocols for production.

Suggested Citation

  • George L. Vairaktarakis, 2013. "Noncooperative Games for Subcontracting Operations," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 15(1), pages 148-158, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:15:y:2013:i:1:p:148-158
    DOI: 10.1287/msom.1120.0410
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Dereniowski, Dariusz & Kubiak, Wiesław, 2020. "Shared processor scheduling of multiprocessor jobs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(2), pages 464-477.
    4. Dereniowski, Dariusz & Kubiak, Wiesław, 2017. "Shared multi-processor scheduling," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(2), pages 503-514.

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