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Self-Regulation of an Unobservable Queue

Author

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  • Moshe Haviv

    (Department of Statistics and Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91905 Jerusalem, Israel)

  • Binyamin Oz

    (Department of Statistics, University of Auckland, Auckland 1042, New Zealand)

Abstract

We consider an unobservable M / M /1 queue where customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. It is well known that left to themselves, in equilibrium, customers join the queue at a rate higher than is socially optimal. Hence, regulation schemes, under which the resulting equilibrium joining rate coincides with the socially optimal one, should be considered. We suggest a classification of regulation schemes based on a few desired properties and use it to classify schemes from the existing literature. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing schemes possesses all of the properties, and in this paper we suggest such a scheme. Its novelty is in assigning random priorities to customers, prior to their decision whether to join or balk. We also introduce variations of this regulation scheme as well as others that are also based on randomization. The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2728 . This paper was accepted by Gad Allon, operations management.

Suggested Citation

  • Moshe Haviv & Binyamin Oz, 2018. "Self-Regulation of an Unobservable Queue," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(5), pages 2380-2389, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:64:y:2018:i:5:p:2380-2389
    DOI: mnsc.2017.2728
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Antonis Economou & Vidyadhar Kulkarni, 2020. "Editorial introduction to the special issue on ‘Strategic queueing: game-theoretic models in queueing theory’—part 1," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 96(3), pages 201-203, December.
    2. Li, Zhong-Ping & Chang, Aichih (Jasmine) & Zou, Zongbao, 2023. "Design mechanism to coordinate a hierarchical healthcare system: Patient subsidy vs. capacity investment," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    3. Moshe Haviv & Binyamin Oz, 2021. "A busy period approach to some queueing games," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 261-277, April.
    4. Chamberlain, Jonathan & Simhon, Eran & Starobinski, David, 2021. "Preemptible queues with advance reservations: Strategic behavior and revenue management," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 293(2), pages 561-578.
    5. Antonis Economou, 2022. "How much information should be given to the strategic customers of a queueing system?," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 100(3), pages 421-423, April.
    6. Gabi Hanukov & Michael Hassoun & Oren Musicant, 2021. "On the Benefits of Providing Timely Information in Ticket Queues with Balking and Calling Times," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(21), pages 1-16, October.

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