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Overconfidence by Bayesian-Rational Agents

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  • Eric Van den Steen

    (Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts 02163)

Abstract

This paper derives two mechanisms through which Bayesian-rational individuals with differing priors will tend to be relatively overconfident about their estimates and predictions, in the sense of overestimating the precision of these estimates. The intuition behind one mechanism is slightly ironic: In trying to update optimally, Bayesian agents overweight information of which they overestimate the precision and underweight in the opposite case. This causes overall an overestimation of the precision of the final estimate, which tends to increase as agents get more data. This paper was accepted by Teck Ho, decision analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Van den Steen, 2011. "Overconfidence by Bayesian-Rational Agents," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(5), pages 884-896, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:57:y:2011:i:5:p:884-896
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1323
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    3. Michael D. Grubb, 2015. "Overconfident Consumers in the Marketplace," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 29(4), pages 9-36, Fall.
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    9. J. A. García & Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez & J. Fdez-Valdivia, 2016. "Why the referees’ reports I receive as an editor are so much better than the reports I receive as an author?," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 106(3), pages 967-986, March.
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    12. Louis Lévy-Garboua & Muniza Askari & Marco Gazel, 2018. "Confidence biases and learning among intuitive Bayesians," Post-Print hal-01558394, HAL.
    13. Kataria, Mitesh, 2017. "How long do you think it will take? Field Evidence on Gender Differences in Time Optimism," Working Papers in Economics 694, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    14. John S. Chen & David C. Croson & Daniel W. Elfenbein & Hart E. Posen, 2018. "The Impact of Learning and Overconfidence on Entrepreneurial Entry and Exit," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(6), pages 989-1009, December.
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    16. Martin Koudstaal & Randolph Sloof & Mirjam van Praag, 2015. "Are Entrepreneurs more Optimistic and Overconfident than Managers and Employees?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-124/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
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    20. Xiaochao Wei & Yanfei Zhang & Qi Liao & Guihua Nie, 2022. "Multi-Agent Simulation of Product Diffusion in Online Social Networks from the Perspective of Overconfidence and Network Effects," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(11), pages 1-18, May.
    21. Shoufeng Ji & Dan Zhao & Xiaoshuai Peng, 2018. "Joint Decisions on Emission Reduction and Inventory Replenishment with Overconfidence and Low-Carbon Preference," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-21, April.
    22. Citci, Sadettin Haluk & Inci, Eren, 2016. "Career concerns and Bayesian overconfidence of managers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 137-159.
    23. Johannes Binswanger & Anja Garbely & Manuel Oechslin, 2023. "Investor beliefs about transformative innovations under uncertainty," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(360), pages 1119-1144, October.
    24. Jiang, Li & Hao, Zhongyuan, 2024. "Holding diverse market beliefs by firms: Information flow, profit performances, and channel structure," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).

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