—Assumptions, Explanation, and Prediction in Marketing Science: “It's the Findings, Stupid, Not the Assumptions”
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DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1080.0463
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Keywords
assumptions; explanation; prediction; mechanism; realism; research design;All these keywords.
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