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The Ombudsman: Employee Ownership as a Mechanism to Enhance Corporate Governance and Moderate Executive Pay Levels

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  • Derek C. Jones

    (Hamilton College, Clinton, New York 13323)

Abstract

By drawing on information about firms, including the Mondragon cooperatives and major Japanese corporations, I provide evidence on ways in which employee ownership may improve corporate governance and moderate executive pay levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Derek C. Jones, 2013. "The Ombudsman: Employee Ownership as a Mechanism to Enhance Corporate Governance and Moderate Executive Pay Levels," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 43(6), pages 599-601, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:orinte:v:43:y:2013:i:6:p:599-601
    DOI: 10.1287/inte.2013.0709
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kruse, Douglas L. & Freeman, Richard B. & Blasi, Joseph R. (ed.), 2010. "Shared Capitalism at Work," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226056951, June.
    2. Dow,Gregory K., 2003. "Governing the Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818537, November.
    3. John Pencavel, 2013. "Worker cooperatives and democratic governance," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 24, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Philippe Jacquart & J. Scott Armstrong, 2013. "The Ombudsman: Are Top Executives Paid Enough? An Evidence-Based Review," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 43(6), pages 580-589, December.
    5. Kato, Takao & Kubo, Katsuyuki, 2006. "CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-19, March.
    6. Jones, Derek C & Kato, Takao, 1995. "The Productivity Effects of Employee Stock-Ownership Plans and Bonuses: Evidence from Japanese Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 391-414, June.
    7. Fathi Fakhfakh & Virginie Pérotin & MÓnica Gago, 2012. "Productivity, Capital, and Labor in Labor-Managed and Conventional Firms: An Investigation on French Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 65(4), pages 847-879, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. J. Scott Armstrong & Philippe Jacquart, 2013. "The Ombudsman: Is the Evidence Sufficient to Take Action on Executive Pay? Reply to Commentators," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 43(6), pages 602-604, December.

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