IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/orinte/v41y2011i4p327-337.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

UCSF Increases Consumer Value Through Optimal Vendor-Show Scheduling

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew G. Clark

    (Strategic Sourcing Unit, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94143)

  • Susan Cholette

    (Decision Science Department, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California 94132)

  • Ozgur Ozluk

    (Decision Science Department, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California 94132)

Abstract

The University of California San Francisco (UCSF) spends approximately $600 million annually on goods and services. To lower the total cost of goods purchased while maintaining quality and service, UCSF Strategic Sourcing establishes strategic agreements with select vendors. These agreements are marketed to the campus community through vendor shows that allow vendors to showcase their value proposition directly to UCSF researchers and buyers. This paper formulates the creation of the UCSF vendor-show schedule as a bipartite matching problem with side constraints, which is then solved using a binary integer program. Of the 3,818 vendor-show combinations, the model identifies 153 optimal assignments and increases potential incentives by 62 percent compared to the manually generated 2007 schedule. The model also improves vendor diversity and selects the most suitable vendors for each show. Last, it dramatically reduces the time required to generate the schedule. Strategic Sourcing management is pleased with the results and implemented the model for the 2010 vendor-show season.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew G. Clark & Susan Cholette & Ozgur Ozluk, 2011. "UCSF Increases Consumer Value Through Optimal Vendor-Show Scheduling," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 41(4), pages 327-337, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:orinte:v:41:y:2011:i:4:p:327-337
    DOI: 10.1287/inte.1110.0568
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/inte.1110.0568
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/inte.1110.0568?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ladislav Lettovský & Ellis L. Johnson & George L. Nemhauser, 2000. "Airline Crew Recovery," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(4), pages 337-348, November.
    2. Dries Goossens & Frits Spieksma, 2009. "Scheduling the Belgian Soccer League," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 39(2), pages 109-118, April.
    3. Thomas A. Grandine, 1998. "Assigning Season Tickets Fairly," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 28(4), pages 15-20, August.
    4. Gerald G. Brown & Robert F. Dell & R. Kevin Wood, 1997. "Optimization and Persistence," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 27(5), pages 15-37, October.
    5. Jeffrey E. Dillon & Spyros Kontogiorgis, 1999. "US Airways Optimizes the Scheduling of Reserve Flight Crews," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 29(5), pages 123-131, October.
    6. Susan Cholette, 2007. "A Novel Problem for a Vintage Technique: Using Mixed-Integer Programming to Match Wineries and Distributors," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 37(3), pages 231-239, June.
    7. A. T. Ernst & R. G. J. Mills & P. Welgama, 2003. "Scheduling Appointments at Trade Events for the Australian Tourist Commission," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 33(3), pages 12-23, June.
    8. Mark Armstrong Author-Email: mark.armstrong@ucl.ac.uk Author-Workplace-Name: University College of London, 2006. "Competition in Two-Sided Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 668-691, Autumn.
    9. Amar Kumar Narisetty & Jean-Philippe P. Richard & David Ramcharan & Deby Murphy & Gayle Minks & Jim Fuller, 2008. "An Optimization Model for Empty Freight Car Assignment at Union Pacific Railroad," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 38(2), pages 89-102, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Milind G. Sohoni & Ellis L. Johnson & T. Glenn Bailey, 2004. "Long-Range Reserve Crew Manpower Planning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(6), pages 724-739, June.
    2. Schrotenboer, Albert H. & Wenneker, Rob & Ursavas, Evrim & Zhu, Stuart X., 2023. "Reliable reserve-crew scheduling for airlines," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    3. Susan Cholette, 2007. "A Novel Problem for a Vintage Technique: Using Mixed-Integer Programming to Match Wineries and Distributors," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 37(3), pages 231-239, June.
    4. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2009. "Mobile Call Termination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(538), pages 270-307, June.
    5. Estelle Malavolti, 2016. "Single Till or Dual Till at airports: a Two-Sided Market Analysis," Post-Print hal-01406372, HAL.
    6. Baglioni, Laura & Calabrese, Armando & Ghiron, Nathan Levialdi, 2013. "Net neutrality at internet backbone provider level," 24th European Regional ITS Conference, Florence 2013 88506, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    7. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    8. Lam, W., 2015. "Switching Costs in Two-sided Markets," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2015024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Lapo Filistrucchi & Tobias J. Klein, 2013. "Price Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Consumers and Network Effects," Working Papers 13-20, NET Institute.
    10. Kevin J. Boudreau & Andrei Hagiu, 2009. "Platform Rules: Multi-Sided Platforms as Regulators," Chapters, in: Annabelle Gawer (ed.), Platforms, Markets and Innovation, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Yong-Jae Choi, 2014. "Regulation of Program Licensing Fee in Korean CATV Industry: Is it Welfare-Improving?," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 30, pages 369-384.
    12. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2013. "Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design," Discussion Papers 1559, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Alexandre de Corniere, 2013. "Search Advertising," Economics Series Working Papers 649, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    14. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021. "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    15. Claire M. Weiller & Michael G. Pollitt, 2013. "Platform markets and energy services," Working Papers EPRG 1334, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    16. Michael R. Miller & Robert J. Alexander & Vincent A. Arbige & Robert F. Dell & Steven R. Kremer & Brian P. McClune & Jane E. Oppenlander & Joshua P. Tomlin, 2017. "Optimal Allocation of Students to Naval Nuclear-Power Training Units," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 47(4), pages 320-335, August.
    17. Dietrich, Antje-Mareike, 2016. "Governmental platform intermediation to promote alternative fuel vehicles," Economics Department Working Paper Series 16, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
    18. Dittmann, Heidi & Kuchinke, Björn A., 2016. "Sharing Economy and Regulation," 27th European Regional ITS Conference, Cambridge (UK) 2016 148665, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    19. Claude Crampes & Carole Haritchabalet & Bruno Jullien, 2009. "Advertising, Competition And Entry In Media Industries," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 7-31, March.
    20. Bolt, Wilko & Tieman, Alexander F., 2008. "Heavily skewed pricing in two-sided markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1250-1255, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:orinte:v:41:y:2011:i:4:p:327-337. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.