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Discussion of the Competitive Strategies of Telecom Operators and Over-the-Top Service Providers from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

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  • Hsi Tse Wang

    (Department of Information and e-Commerce Management, TransWorld University, Douliu City, Yunlin County 640, Taiwan, Republic of China)

Abstract

Over-the-top (OTT) service refers to content included in basic telecommunications subscriptions without the additional features provided by telecom operators. The booming OTT business has had a huge impact on traditional telecommunications businesses such as voice and short message services, and the sense of crisis among telecommunications operators shows that the channeling trend has become more and more obvious. Faced with competition on the distribution of interests between channels and contents, telecommunications operators and OTT service providers are engaged in a fierce competition and cooperation game. To explore this competition relationship, this paper first establishes an evolutionary model, discussing the competition and cooperation behaviors of telecommunications operators and OTT service providers, and then conducts research on the degree of the effects of cooperation in terms of the combination of strategic factors, including cooperation cost sharing, the benefits distribution mechanism, research and development benefits, spillover effect, and network externality. Additionally, a replicator dynamic system is developed to study the influence of related strategic factors on evolutionary equilibrium. Finally, to verify the theoretical results, a simulation experiment is conducted to further clarify the meaning of the model and obtain meaningful results. The evolutionary game model and method provided in this paper are expected to help both parties make better decisions for future operating strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Hsi Tse Wang, 2020. "Discussion of the Competitive Strategies of Telecom Operators and Over-the-Top Service Providers from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 260-275, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:17:y:2020:i:3:p:260-275
    DOI: 10.1287/deca.2019.0407
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vicki M. Bier, 2020. "From the Editor: Advances in Multi-Agent Decision Making," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 187-188, September.
    2. Park, Sungwook & Kwon, Youngsun, 2023. "Disentangling the effects on OTT platform performance of three strategies: Pricing, M&As, and content investments," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(8).
    3. Yunke Mai & Bin Hu, 2023. "Optimizing Free-to-Play Multiplayer Games with Premium Subscription," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3437-3456, June.
    4. Yunke Mai & Bin Hu & Saša Pekeč, 2023. "Courteous or Crude? Managing User Conduct to Improve On-Demand Service Platform Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 996-1016, February.
    5. Thomas Kamalakis & Georgia Dede & Christos Michalakelis & Mara Nikolaidou, 2024. "Game-theoretic analysis of competition between access service providers utilizing a Nash genetic algorithm," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 1-30, June.

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