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States Of Nature And Indicators Of Manager’S Corruption In Indonesia

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  • Putu Anom Mahadwartha

Abstract

This research investigates private sector corruption. The research focuses on a firm’s life cycle as it relates to corruption. Free cash flows to dividends and leverage are used as indicators of private sector corruption. The research examines Non-financial firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 1994 to 2006 including 1,680 observation years. Six hypotheses are tested using the Generalized Methods of Moments and Wald tests. The results demonstrate that leverage policy is a major indicator of firm micro level corruption while dividend policy is not. The results show maturity stage firms have the highest corruption levels and declining stage firms have the lowest levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Putu Anom Mahadwartha, 2010. "States Of Nature And Indicators Of Manager’S Corruption In Indonesia," Global Journal of Business Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 4(3), pages 25-45.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibf:gjbres:v:4:y:2010:i:3:p:25-45
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Putu Anom Mahadwartha, 2016. "Roles of Affiliated Ownership on Manager’s Perquisites in Indonesia: Stage of Firm Cycle Approach," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 11(8), pages 213-213, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Growth; maturity; star; decline; free cash flow; dividend; leverage; corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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