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In Defense of Central Bank Independence against its Enthusiasts

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  • JOSÉ MANUEL GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMO

    (IESE Business School)

Abstract

The problem of time inconsistency provides the basic economic rationale behind the independence of central banks, understood as the most suitable institutional mechanism for ensuring price stability. According to the consensus that emerged in the 1990s and the 2000s, endowing the central bank with independent decision-making authority over the use of monetary policy instruments, with a mandate for price stability, enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy and reduces the inflation volatility. It may be surprising that criticisms of the once almost sacrosanct independence arise after the Great Financial Crisis, when it is widely recognized that central banks “saved the world” from repeating the Great Depression of the 1930s. The paper is an attempt to explain the rationale why these cracks in the consensus have arisen and offers suggestions what to do about it. Independence has an economic basis that is as solid as its political foundation is fragile, because central banks are unelected power. And in the realm of economics and politics, the political economy of central banking may help us understand the evolution of the degree and the specific form of independence because of both internal and external political and economic constraints. The paper examines these issues in some detail, to contextualize the economic and non-economic threats to independence and discusses possible mitigants. Properly assessing the challenges is a prerequisite for preserving the value of this institution, which is perhaps the most important and effective institutional innovation of our time in macroeconomic policy.

Suggested Citation

  • José Manuel González-Páramo, 2024. "In Defense of Central Bank Independence against its Enthusiasts," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 250(3), pages 109-128, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2024:v:250:i:3:p:109-128
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank independence; Monetary economics; Independent regulatory agencies; Political economy of monetary policy.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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