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Game Behavior Analysis between the Local Government and Land-Lost Peasants in the Urbanization Process

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  • Lu Zhang

    (Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Urumqi 830011, China
    University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China)

  • Hongru Du

    (Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Urumqi 830011, China)

  • Yannan Zhao

    (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
    Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources, Research and Key Laboratory of Regional Sustainable Development Modeling, Beijing 100101, China)

Abstract

China is entering a period of rapid urban development. With the rapid expansion of cities, a large number of peasants have lost their land as a result. Given the development of urbanization, safeguarding the rights and interests of land-lost peasants in the process of urbanization has become a new topic of interest in China. In this study, based on game theory, we analyze the interests of the local government and land-lost peasants in several rounds of the citizenization process. The result demonstrated the following: (1) this paper proposed that overall interest declines in the entire game, in which the peasant can obtain a greater share of benefits from bargaining with the local government; (2) However, a long bargaining process would lead to the diminishment of peasants’ rights and benefits. In contrast, the local government would obtain greater share of benefits than the peasant and would obtain fewer benefits than at the beginning of the process. Therefore, both sides expect to end the game process early; (3) Under the “rational economic man” process, this process will always tend to be one in which one party struggles while the other compromises. Therefore, in the game, the game process will not reach a game equilibrium state and both sides will be at a stalemate; (4) The local government, as the power owner, is expected to surrender its interests as the “rational economic man” for the Pareto optimality; (5) Finally, we proposed policy recommendations for the sustainability of citizenization. Increasing the public service benefits, establishing the system of subsistence allowances and raising the minimum living allowance of citizenization, improving the training and employment service system for the peasant can improve land-lost peasants’ acceptance in the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Lu Zhang & Hongru Du & Yannan Zhao, 2016. "Game Behavior Analysis between the Local Government and Land-Lost Peasants in the Urbanization Process," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(12), pages 1-15, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:8:y:2016:i:12:p:1213-:d:83832
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
    2. Shenjing He & Yuting Liu & Chris Webster & Fulong Wu, 2009. "Property Rights Redistribution, Entitlement Failure and the Impoverishment of Landless Farmers in China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 46(9), pages 1925-1949, August.
    3. Tan, Rong & Qu, Futian & Heerink, Nico & Mettepenningen, Evy, 2011. "Rural to urban land conversion in China — How large is the over-conversion and what are its welfare implications?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 474-484.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Jing Qian & Yunfei Peng & Cheng Luo & Chao Wu & Qingyun Du, 2015. "Urban Land Expansion and Sustainable Land Use Policy in Shenzhen: A Case Study of China’s Rapid Urbanization," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(1), pages 1-16, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Xuesong Sun & Zaisheng Zhang & Yiye Zhang, 2018. "Factors Influencing Farmer’s Decision-Making Behavior on Rural Construction Land Transformation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-17, November.
    2. Libang Ma & Meimei Chen & Xinglong Che & Fang Fang, 2019. "Farmers’ Rural-To-Urban Migration, Influencing Factors and Development Framework: A Case Study of Sihe Village of Gansu, China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(5), pages 1-19, March.

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