Sustainability of the Rural Environment Based on a Tripartite Game Among Government, Enterprises, and Farmers Under the Prisoner’s Dilemma

In recent years, with rapid economic development, the importance of environmental governance has gradually been overlooked. The increasing pollution caused by rural sewage discharge has posed a significant threat to the local ecological environment. In this context, this paper treats the local governments, village enterprises, and farmers as the game subjects, integrating them with prisoner’s dilemma theory to construct a tripartite game model. By analyzing the equilibrium points and stability of the model, as well as the effects of the parameters in the dynamic equations, this paper reveals the evolution of strategic choices made by different participants. The results indicate that the optimal strategy for local governments is strict regulation, and village enterprises tend to adopt purification measures, while farmers weigh the costs and benefits and exhibit a negative attitude toward participating in governance. Finally, from a practical perspective, this paper offers suggestions for improving rural ecological environmental protection by engaging local governments, village enterprises, and farmers, aiming to promote the sustainable development of the ecological environment.