Party Branch Embeddedness and Urban–Rural Environmental Inequality: Self-Regulation or Pollution Shelter?

With the deepening of environmental governance, the overall environmental quality of the region has been improved. However, internal environmental inequality, especially urban–rural environmental inequality, has continued to come to the fore. Nevertheless, there are still few studies on how to mitigate the increasing urban–rural environmental inequality. On the basis of examining the urban–rural environmental inequality in China’s environmental emission reduction investment dimension, this research verified the impact and mechanism of informal regulatory forces (grassroots party organizations) in alleviating urban–rural environmental inequality. In particular, based on an empirical analysis of data from the Chinese Private Enterprise Survey (CPES) 2006–2014, this study found that (1) investment in environmental management of polluting enterprises in rural areas is significantly lower than in urban areas, and the trend of urban–rural environmental inequality is intensifying; (2) urban–rural environmental inequality is more pronounced at the enterprise level in areas with larger enterprises and greater environmental enforcement and that urban-centered environmental regulatory policies continue to exacerbate urban–rural environmental inequality; and (3) the embeddedness of regional party organizations can narrow the gap between urban and rural environmental protection investment by private enterprises and alleviate urban–rural environmental inequality. The specific pathway is to improve rural enterprises’ social responsibility awareness and policy implementation. Based on the above findings, this paper argues that a gradual break with “urban-centered environmentalism” is the fundamental solution to urban–rural environmental inequality. However, in the current context of limited resources for formal environmental regulation, the power of informal environmental regulation can still mitigate these effects.