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A Study of Quantum Game for Low-Carbon Transportation with Government Subsidies and Penalties

Author

Listed:
  • Yongfei Li

    (School of Modern Post, Xi’an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Xi’an 710061, China)

  • Jiangtao Wang

    (School of Modern Post, Xi’an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Xi’an 710061, China)

  • Bin Wang

    (College of Business and Public Management, Kean University-Wenzhou Campus, Wenzhou 325060, China)

  • Clark Luo

    (Waikato Institute of Technology, Hamilton 3204, New Zealand)

Abstract

Traditional classical game theory struggles to effectively address the inefficiencies in subsidizing and penalizing the R&D and production of low-carbon transportation vehicles. To avoid the shortcomings of classic game theory, this research integrates quantum game theory with Nash games to explore the characteristics of automakers’ behavior for low-carbon transportation with government subsidies and penalties. We first constructed a low-carbon transportation game model between the government and automakers. Then, the optimal profit strategies for both parties in a quantum entangled state were analyzed. Finally, the impact of quantum superposition states and the initial entangled state on the profit strategies of both parties was simulated and analyzed using Monte Carlo simulations. We find that under the joint effects of government subsidies and penalties, quantum game states and the initial quantum entangled state have a crucial influence on the game’s outcomes. They can encourage the realization of Nash equilibrium and perfect coordination in the quantum game, significantly increasing the profits for both parties. This in turn effectively stimulates automakers to research and produce low-carbon transportation solutions, promoting the rapid development of low-carbon transportation technology. In theory, this research can enrich the Quantum game for improvements in the Nash equilibrium solution for the government to subsidize and penalize the low-carbon transportation problem. Meanwhile, in practice, it can provide guidance and reference in optimal strategy selection conditions for government policymakers and automakers for low-carbon transportation.

Suggested Citation

  • Yongfei Li & Jiangtao Wang & Bin Wang & Clark Luo, 2024. "A Study of Quantum Game for Low-Carbon Transportation with Government Subsidies and Penalties," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(7), pages 1-23, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:7:p:3051-:d:1370935
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    References listed on IDEAS

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