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Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game in the Recycling Utilization of Sulfate-Rich Wastewater

Author

Listed:
  • Meng Ding

    (School of Urban Planning and Design, Shenzhen Graduate School, Peking University, Shenzhen 518055, China
    IER Environmental Protection Engineering Technology Co., Ltd., Shenzhen 518071, China)

  • Hui Zeng

    (School of Urban Planning and Design, Shenzhen Graduate School, Peking University, Shenzhen 518055, China)

Abstract

Current industrial development has led to an increase in sulfate-rich industrial sewage, threatening industrial ecology and the environment. Incorrectly treating high-concentration sulfate wastewater can cause serious environmental problems and even harm human health. Water with high sulfate levels can be treated as a resource and treated harmlessly to meet the needs of the circular economy. Today, governments worldwide are working hard to encourage the safe disposal and reuse of industrial salt-rich wastewater by recycling sulfate-rich wastewater (SRW) resources. However, the conflict of interests between the SRW production department, the SRW recycling department, and the governments often make it challenging to effectively manage sulfate-rich wastewater resources. This study aims to use the mechanism of evolutionary game theory (EGT) to conduct theoretical modelling and simulation analysis on the interaction of the behaviour of the above three participants. This paper focuses on the impact of government intervention and the ecological behaviour of wastewater producers on the behavioural decisions of recyclers. The results suggest that the government should play a leading role in developing the SRW resource recovery industry. SRW producers protect the environment in the mature stage, and recyclers actively collect and recover compliant sulfate wastewater resources. Governments should gradually deregulate and eventually withdraw from the market. Qualified recyclers and environmentally friendly wastewater producers can benefit from a mature SRW resources recovery industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Meng Ding & Hui Zeng, 2022. "Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game in the Recycling Utilization of Sulfate-Rich Wastewater," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(14), pages 1-20, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:19:y:2022:i:14:p:8770-:d:866108
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    References listed on IDEAS

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