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Whether the CEO Turnover Can Improve the Conversion of Enterprise’s New and Old Driving Force?

Author

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  • Hongyu Liu

    (School of Management, Jilin University, Changchun 130022, China)

  • Yufei Chen

    (International Business School, University of International Business and Economics; Beijing 100029, China)

  • Sijian Wu

    (School of Statistics and Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China)

  • Shukuan Zhao

    (School of Management, Jilin University, Changchun 130022, China)

Abstract

After 2014, China focused on supply-side reform and put forward the concept of replacing old driving with new driving force, which can create a new round of economic improvement. From the perspective of the conversion of old and new driving forces of enterprises, this paper takes the listed enterprises in China’s a-share manufacturing industry from 2016 to 2018 as samples. This paper also discusses the “Net Effect” of CEO turnover on the conversion of new and old driving forces of enterprises. The results reflect that CEO turnover has a negative effect on the conversion of old and new driving force. Moving forward, when the CEO and chairman changes at the same time or the ownership of the enterprise turns to state-owned, the change of CEO has a higher degree of prevention on the conversion of old and new force. The number of board’s conferences and the degree of equity balance will increase the negative effect of CEO turnover on the conversion of old and new driving force.

Suggested Citation

  • Hongyu Liu & Yufei Chen & Sijian Wu & Shukuan Zhao, 2020. "Whether the CEO Turnover Can Improve the Conversion of Enterprise’s New and Old Driving Force?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(9), pages 1-18, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:12:y:2020:i:9:p:3732-:d:354032
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