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CEO and director compensation, CEO turnover and institutional investors: Is there cronyism in the UK?

Author

Listed:
  • Chen, Jie
  • Goergen, Marc
  • Leung, Woon Sau
  • Song, Wei

Abstract

This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely associated with agency problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Jie & Goergen, Marc & Leung, Woon Sau & Song, Wei, 2019. "CEO and director compensation, CEO turnover and institutional investors: Is there cronyism in the UK?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 18-35.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:103:y:2019:i:c:p:18-35
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.03.019
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Olaolu Richard Olayeni, 2020. "A new perspective into the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance: evidence from Nigeria’s listed firms," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 22(2), pages 250-277, December.
    2. Dah, Mustafa A., 2023. "Board refreshment and director excess compensation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    3. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Ademola Obafemi Young & Xuan Vinh Vo & Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al‐Faryan, 2022. "Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3386-3403, December.
    4. Sara De Masi & Kose John & Agnieszka Słomka-Gołębiowska & Piotr Urbanek, 2023. "Regulation and post-crisis pay disclosure strategies of banks," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 1243-1275, November.
    5. Liu, Cai & Yin, Chao, 2023. "Institutional investors’ monitoring attention, CEO compensation, and relative performance evaluation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    6. Fai Lim Loi & Jean Jinghan Chen & Zhuo Qiao, 2023. "CEO cultural background and corporate cash holdings," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(S1), pages 1069-1100, April.
    7. Hongyu Liu & Yufei Chen & Sijian Wu & Shukuan Zhao, 2020. "Whether the CEO Turnover Can Improve the Conversion of Enterprise’s New and Old Driving Force?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(9), pages 1-18, May.
    8. Lily Nguyen & Le Vu & Xiangkang Yin, 2021. "The bright side of co‐opted boards: Evidence from firm innovation," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 29-53, February.
    9. Li, Ziyang & Chen, Yanjun & Li, Yanlin, 2023. "Top management abnormal turnover and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    10. Huang, Wenxuan & Xu, Weidong & Gao, Xin & Li, Donghui & Fu, Wentao, 2023. "Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation: UK evidence," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    11. Desir, Rosemond & Seavey, Scott E. & Thevenot, Maya, 2024. "Information transfer of CEO turnover: Evidence from firm-CEO mismatch," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agency problems; Director compensation; CEO turnover; Institutional investors; Board effectiveness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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