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Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and forced CEO turnover

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  • Zhong, Ruohan
  • Li, Yanxi
  • Wang, Yun

Abstract

Using manually collected data of Chinese listed non-financial corporations, we find that multiple large shareholders (MLS) inhibit performance sensitivity to forced CEO turnover and are unrelated to forced CEO turnover-integrity sensitivity. The similar identities fail to affect the relationship between MLS and forced turnover-performance sensitivity. The results illustrate that the reduced performance sensitivity to forced turnover stems from the controlling coalition of MLS in emerging economies. The equity balance, large shareholders' size, and the absence of controlling shareholders can escalate the inhibiting effect of MLS. State-owned ownership mitigates the inhibiting role of MLS through political governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhong, Ruohan & Li, Yanxi & Wang, Yun, 2021. "Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and forced CEO turnover," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ememar:v:48:y:2021:i:c:s1566014121000248
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2021.100816
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