IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v11y2019i17p4619-d260833.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Moderating Effects of the Timing of Reward Determination and Performance Standards between Rewards and Self-Efficacy for Sustainable Intrinsic Motivation

Author

Listed:
  • Joowoong Park

    (Moon Soul Graduate School of Future Strategy, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon 34141, Korea
    Policy & Cooperation Division, Korea Aerospace Research Institute, Daejeon 34133, Korea)

  • Jae-Suk Yang

    (Moon Soul Graduate School of Future Strategy, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon 34141, Korea)

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to determine the moderating effects of the timing of reward determination and performance standards on the relationship between pay-for-performance and self-efficacy. It is an experimental study; the sample included 352 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk, and an online experiment was conducted on an external website. The model was tested for mediation and moderation processes using regression analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA). The results showed a mediating effect of self-efficacy between pay-for-performance and intrinsic motivation. A moderating effect of performance standards (absolute, relative, ambiguous) on the relationship between pay-for-performance and self-efficacy was also found. Moreover, performance standards were found to be more important moderators than the timing of reward determination. The theoretical contribution of this paper was to observe the concept of timing of reward determination and empirically validate self-determination theory. The results also infer that people measure their own efficacy or competence by comparing themselves with others more than with other performance standards. The use of absolute performance standards is recommended for sustainable self-efficacy and intrinsic motivation of employees. This study introduced the concept of the timing of reward determination (i.e., before or after completion of a performance-related task) and verified the moderating effect of performance standards.

Suggested Citation

  • Joowoong Park & Jae-Suk Yang, 2019. "Moderating Effects of the Timing of Reward Determination and Performance Standards between Rewards and Self-Efficacy for Sustainable Intrinsic Motivation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(17), pages 1-20, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:11:y:2019:i:17:p:4619-:d:260833
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/17/4619/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/17/4619/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Li Yi & Md. Aftab Uddin & Anupam Kumar Das & Monowar Mahmood & Shanewaz Mahmood Sohel, 2019. "Do Transformational Leaders Engage Employees in Sustainable Innovative Work Behaviour? Perspective from a Developing Country," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(9), pages 1-18, April.
    2. Chung-Jen Wang & Kuan-Ju Tseng, 2019. "Effects of Selected Positive Resources on Hospitality Service Quality: The Mediating Role of Work Engagement," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(8), pages 1-17, April.
    3. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
    4. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Xinshu Zhao & John G. Lynch & Qimei Chen, 2010. "Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths and Truths about Mediation Analysis," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 37(2), pages 197-206, August.
    6. Olivier Godechot, 2017. "Wages, Bonuses and Appropriation of Profit in the Financial Industry. The Working Rich," Post-Print hal-01433807, HAL.
    7. Morgan, Pauline M. & Tindale, R. Scott, 2002. "Group vs Individual Performance in Mixed-Motive Situations: Exploring an Inconsistency," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 44-65, January.
    8. Kingsley Osei Boahene & Jiaming Fang & Frank Sampong, 2019. "Social Media Usage and Tertiary Students’ Academic Performance: Examining the Influences of Academic Self-Efficacy and Innovation Characteristics," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(8), pages 1-17, April.
    9. repec:cup:judgdm:v:5:y:2010:i:5:p:411-419 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sara Cabanas & Teresa Proença & Mauro Carozzo-Todaro, 2020. "Pay for Individual Performance: Aiding or Harming Sustainable Intrinsic Motivation?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(16), pages 1-13, August.
    2. Hyunmin Choe & Yongwon Kim & Sungok Moon, 2022. "The Effect of Labor Flexibility on Financial Performance in Korea: The Moderating Effect of Labor Relations Climate," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-13, February.
    3. Heetae Park & Wonseok Choi & Seung-Wan Kang, 2020. "When Is the Negative Effect of Abusive Supervision on Task Performance Mitigated? An Empirical Study of Public Service Officers in Korea," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(12), pages 1-10, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hickfang, Michael & Holder, Ulrike, 2018. "The impact of stock options on risk-taking: Founder-CEOs and innovation," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 12/2018, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    2. Kato, Takao & Kim, Woochan & Lee, Ju Ho, 2007. "Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 36-55, January.
    3. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
    4. Ruslan Gurtoviy & Luis G. González, 2008. "How Much to Pay in Cash? Employee Retention via Stock Options," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-24, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    5. Andrea Melis & Silvia Carta, 2010. "Does accounting regulation enhance corporate governance? Evidence from the disclosure of share-based remuneration," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 14(4), pages 435-446, November.
    6. Meng, Rujing & Ning, Xiangdong & Zhou, Xianming & Zhu, Hongquan, 2011. "Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China's reform experiment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1541-1551, June.
    7. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    9. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2014. "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 230-271, February.
    10. Angelo Baglioni & Luca Colombo, 2009. "Managers’ Compensation And Misreporting: A Costly State Verification Approach," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 278-289, April.
    11. Sautner, Zacharias & Weber, Martin, 2005. "Corporate governance and the design of stock option programs," Papers 05-32, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    12. Cook, Douglas O. & Chowdhury, Jaideep & Zhang, Weiwei, 2023. "Director optimism and CEO equity compensation," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 143-162.
    13. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
    14. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2004. "Compensating Employees Below the Executive Ranks: A Comparison of Options, Restricted Stock, and Cash," NBER Working Papers 10221, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Yu, Zeng, 2024. "Essays on incentive contract and corporate finance," Other publications TiSEM 6f66f49e-d710-44f6-943d-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Ng, Lilian & Sibilkov, Valeriy & Wang, Qinghai & Zaiats, Nataliya, 2011. "Does shareholder approval requirement of equity compensation plans matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1510-1530.
    17. Claudio Michelacci & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2009. "Financial Markets and Wages," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(2), pages 795-827.
    18. Petra Duenhaupt, 2011. "The Impact of Financialization on Income Distribution in the USA and Germany: A Proposal for a New Adjusted Wage Share," IMK Working Paper 7-2011, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    19. Tang, Chun-Hua, 2012. "Revisiting the incentive effects of executive stock options," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 564-574.
    20. Khurram, Muhammad Usman & Chen, Lifeng & Abedin, Mohammad Zoynul & Adu, Douglas A. & Lucey, Brian, 2024. "ESG disclosure and internal pay gap: Empirical evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 228-244.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:11:y:2019:i:17:p:4619-:d:260833. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.