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Political Competition, Resource Availability, and Conflict: A Simulation

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  • Troy Siemers

    (Departments of Economics and Business, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA 24450, USA
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Atin Basuchoudhary

    (Departments of Economics and Business, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA 24450, USA
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

Abstract

This paper explores the dynamics of political competition, resource availability, and conflict through a simulation-based approach. Utilizing agent-based models (ABMs) within an evolutionary game theoretical framework, we investigate how individual behaviors and motivations influence collective outcomes in civil conflicts. Our study builds on the theoretical model developed by Basuchoudhary et al. (2023), which integrates factors such as resource availability, state capacity, and political entrepreneurship to explain the evolution of civil conflict. By simulating boundedly rational agents, we demonstrate how changes in resource availability can alter the nature of civil conflict, leading to different equilibrium outcomes. The findings highlight the importance of understanding individual motivations and adaptive behaviors in predicting the stability and resolution of conflicts. This research contributes to the growing body of literature on the use of agent-based models in evolutionary game theory and provides valuable insights into the complex interactions that drive civil violence.

Suggested Citation

  • Troy Siemers & Atin Basuchoudhary, 2025. "Political Competition, Resource Availability, and Conflict: A Simulation," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-16, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:13:y:2025:i:5:p:785-:d:1601076
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    2. Findley, Michael & Rudloff, Peter, 2012. "Combatant Fragmentation and the Dynamics of Civil Wars," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(4), pages 879-901, October.
    3. Atin Basuchoudhary, 2021. "Why Is Civil Conflict Path Dependent? A Cultural Explanation," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-12, December.
    4. Herbert Gintis, 2014. "The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10248.
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